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TOMS-EP CDR Agenda 
Day 1 3 August 1992 
Time Subject 
8:00 Mission Objectives 
8:30 Project Overview 
PDR Actions/Open Issues 
Subcontractors 
Performance Assurance Implementation 
9:30 Key Requirements Vs. Capabilities 
10:30 System Implementation 
System Description 
System Design Integration: 
Mechanical Integration 
Electrical Integration, Command and Telemetry 
12:00 LUNCH 
1:00 Interfaces: 
Launch Vehicle Interfaces and Integration 
Spacecraft Bus to Instrument 
SpacecrafVGround 
2:30 Spacecraft Modes/Redundancy Management 
3:30 System Performance 
Mass Properties 
Alianment 8udaets 
1, CDR Agenda Electrical Power Energy Balance 
Presenter 
D. Stager 
R. Hlavaty 
E. Starr 
B. Dobrotin 
B. Dobrotin 
D. Nicolson 
W. Jhang 
J. Giglio 
B. Dobrotin 
T. Watson 
L. Fesq 
L. Petty 
W. Akle 
D. Muleady 
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TOMS-EP CDR Agenda 
Day 2 4 August 1992 
Time Subject 
8:00 TRW Eagle Test Bed (ETB)· M2 High Bay 
Subsystem Design and Verification 
9:00 Structure and Mechanisms Subsystem (SMS) 
10:00 Thermal Subsystem 
11 :00 Orbit Adjust Subsystem (OAS) 
12:00 LUNCH 
1:00 Communications and Data Handling 
Subsystem (C&DHS) 
2:00 Electrical Power & Distribution Subsystem (EPDS) 
3:00 Attitude Control and Determination 
Subsystem (ACDS) 
4:00 Flight Software 
2, CDR Agenda 
Presenter 
T. Petersen 
J. Castan 
D. Wanous 
A. Alicastro 
J. Kinney 
S. Foroozan 
H. Schmeichel· 
D. Stuart 
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TOMS-EP CDR Agenda 
Day 3 5 August 1992 
Tim~ Subject 
8:00 System Verification 
8:30 Spacecraft Verification 
9:30 EMC/EMI Verification 
Presenter 
B.Dobrotin 
J. Giglio 
R. Bal 
Spacecraft Integration, Test, Launch and Mission Operations 
10:30 System Integration, Test and Launch J.Durschinger 
12:00 LUNCH 
1:00 
2:00 
2:15 
2:40 
3:10 
3:40 
4:05 
4:50 
5:15 
3, CDR Agenda 
Mission Operations 
Performance Assurance 
Reliability IFM EA 
System Safety 
Contamination Control 
Materials and Processes 
EEE Parts 
Hardware Quality Assurance 
Software Quality Assurance 
T. Watson 
E. Starr 
W. Woerner 
D. McGraw 
K. Henderson 
M. Hirsch 
G. Penney 
L. IrWin 
G. Walsh 
• 
1, Sys Verification 
• 
TOMS-EP 
System Verification 
• 
8. Dobrotin 
Verification Objective 
• Assure that the TOMS-EP hardware and software meet the 
requirements of the system specification per NASAlGSFC 
GEVS 
• Presentation of TRW approach is in three parts: 
- That which is done on ETB 
- Total spacecraft verification program 
- EMC/EM I details 
2, Sys Verification 
• • • 
• • 
Eagle Test Bed Verification Approach 
• Verify at most cost effective level of assembly 
• Verify on Eagle Test Bed instead of Spacecraft System 1& T 
• Thorough ETB integration and checkout provide assurance of 
successful TOMS-EP verification 
3, Sys Verification 
• 
TOMS-EP Eagle Test Bed Use 
• STM qualification to TOMS-EP structural requirements 
- . TRW funded 
• Verify subsystem operation prior to 1& T 
- TFS verification (include LFBT) 
- SAR operational verification 
- EMC testing 
4, Sys Verification 
• • • 
• • • 
TOMS-EP Structural Verification 
• Structural dynamic loads analyses, verification data 
• Initial separation shock environment data 
• Array hinge performance verification data 
• Solar array structural performance verification data 
• Alignment stability data 
5, Sys Verification 
8tru'ctural Test Model (8TM) Test Flow 
SOLAR ARRAY 
HINGE TESTS 
- HARNESS RESISTANCE 
-TORQUE MARGIN 
- DEPLOYMENT REPEATABILITY 
STRUCTURE 
PHOTOGRAM-
METRIC SURVEY 
-STRUCTURE 
STABILITY BASELINE 
PANEL 
HINGE TESTS 
- TORQUE MARGIN 
- DEPLOYMENT REPEATIBILITY 
- HINGE STRENGTH 
- HARNESS RESISTANCE 
6 51s Verification , 
• 
HINGE PRE-
.----.... ENVIRONMENTAL 
BASELINE TESTS 
-INITIAL RELEASE 
- ARRAY HINGE 
FUNCTIONAL 
• 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
TESTS 
- SHOCK SURVEY 
-LOVVLEVELFREQUENCY 
RESPONSE 
-SINE BURST 
- RANDOM VIBRATION 
STRUCTURE 
PHOTOGRAM-
METRIC SURVEY 
- STRUCTURE STABILITY 
VALIDATION 
HINGE POST 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
TESTS 
-INITIAL RELEASE 
·ARRAY HINGE 
FUNCTIONAL 
-VVALK OUT 
- DEPLOYMENT IMPACT 
MODEL VALIDATION 
- HINGE STRENGTH 
STORE STM FOR 
FLIGHT ARRAY 
ACOUSTIC 
• 
• • 
TOMS-EP/ETB Subsystem Verification 
• ACDS LFBT 
- Verification is to simulation results 
• EPDS Dynamic Performance Verification 
- Verifies integrated operation: . 
Hardware: ARM 
S,oftware: Charge control 
• TFS ((J B Verification 
- Verification to Software Requirements Specification 
~ Primary focus on hardware/software integration 
7, Sys Verification 
• 
ETB Integration Testing Provides High 
Confidence for TOMS-EP Verification 
8, Sys Verification 
• • • 
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TOMS-EP/ETB EMC Testing 
• Perform all conducted emissions testing on ETB 
• Specific tests: 
- Primary bus ripple 
-. Equipment switching transients 
- Conducted susceptibility 
• Provides characterization of noise on power and signal lines 
- Validation of SEMCAP analysis 
9, Sys Verification 
• 
• 
1, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Spacecraft Verification 
• --~ ... I~-
John Giglio 
• •• • 
• • • 
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VERIFICATION OBJECTIVE: 
• ASSURE THAT THE TOMS·EP HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS 
VERIFICATION APPROACH 
• VERIFY PROTOFLIGHT HARDWARE 
• VERIFY AT MOST COST EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF ASSEMBLY 
• GAIN EARLY DESIGN CONFIDENCE BY USING EAGLE TEST BED 
• USE PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED AND FLOWN HARDWARE WHERE POSSIBLE 
2, Spacecraft Verification 
VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY 
• ESTABLISH AND FLOWDOWN VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
• DEFINE METHODS FOR VERIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS 
.- TEST 
- ANALYSIS 
- DEMONSTRATION 
- INSPECTION 
• DOCUMENT VERIFICATION METHODS IN VERIFICATION MATRICIES IN APPROPRIATE 
SPECIFICATIONS 
• ESTABLISH VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS TRACEABILITY TO SUPPORT SIC SELL-OFF 
3, Spacecraft Verification 
• • • 
• • • 
Verification Process Flow 
DEFINE PERFORMANCE 
& DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
--1 
ESTABLISH & ALLOCATE 
• 
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
• 
. ESTABLISH TEST ESTABLISH ANALYSIS 
& DEMO OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES 
t 
PREPARE TEST PLANS 
" 
AND PROCEDURES PREPARE ANALYSIS 
DOCUMENTATION 
• IMPLEMENT TESTS 
AND DEMONSTRATIONS ,r 
I ~ EVALUATE RESUL TS Vs REQUIREMENTS -
MODIFY DESIGN YES~ AND/OR .- CONFIRM REQUIREMENT TEST / ANAL YSIS 
-REQUIREMENTS VERIFICATION 
.. 
COMPLETE 
4, Spacecraft Verification 
--~ ... 
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Verification Requirements Flowdown 
GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL TOMS-EP 
VERIFICATION SPECIFICATION PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE 
GEVS, DATED JANUARY 1990 REQUIREMENTS 
GSFC -450-006 
TOMS-EP I 
SYSTEM SPECIFICATION TOMS-EP 
SY1-0012 PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
019086 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE I VERIFICATION SPECFICATION 
SY1-0013 
I I I 
INTEGRATION & VERIFICATION COMPONENT DESIGN 
TEST PLAN and TEST SUBSYSTEM 
019251 ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIFICATIONS 
T SPECIFICATION SOFTWARE EV2-0030 
REQUIREMENTS 
,SYSTEM TEST SPECIFICATION I 
PROCEDURES TM-SDA-001 
1 EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS 
TEST REPORTS 
(EQ) 
I I I I 
GROUND SYSTEM CONTAMINATION LIMITED LIFE EMI & -SUSCEPTIBILITY 
TEST PLAN CONTROL PLAN LIST REQUIREMENTS SPEC. 
019082 019817 & CONTROL PLAN 
SR1-0105 
5, Spacecraft Verification 
• • • 
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VERIFICATION TOOLS 
• SYSTEM VERIFICATION MATRIX (APPENDIX B, SY1-0013) 
DEFINES VERIFICATION METHODS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
• VERIFICATION TEST MATRIX (SY1-0013 AND IV&T PLAN 019251) 
DEFINES SYSTEM AND COMPONENT LEVEL TEST REQUIREMENTS 
• VERIFICATION TRACEABILITY MATRIX (DATABASE MAINTAINED BY SE) 
(TO BE COMPLETED 45 DAYS AFTER CDR) 
DEFINES VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND METHODS TRACEABILITY 
• GEVS TO TOMS-EP TRACEABILITY MATRIX (APPENDIX A,SY1-0013) 
PROVIDES TRACEABILITY OF REQUIREMENTS AND APPROACH FOR 
VERIFICATION 
6, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
--~ ... 
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System Verification Matrix Example 
Verification Documentation 
7, Spacecraft Verification 
• • • 
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Verification Test Matrix Example 
• DOCUMENTED IN SY1-0013 AND FLOWED DOWN TO IV&T PLAN D19251 
LEGEND QUALIFICATION STATUS: 
1. COMPLETE QUALIFICATION REQUIRED QUALIFICATION TESTS LEVEL OF ASSEMBLY: . UNITlYPE: 2. PARTIAL QUALIFICATION REQUIRED 
S/C- SPACECRAFT PT - PROTOTYPE (SEE REMARKS) I 
- INSTRUMENT PF -PROTOFLIGHT 3. QUALIFIED BY USE ON PRIOR PROGRAM S 
- SUBSYSTEM F - FLIGHT (SEE REMARKS) 
C - COMPONENT S - SPARE 4. OTHERWISE QUALIFIED (SEE REMARKS) EM -ENGRG. 'i 5.QUALIFIED ON TOMS-EP 
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SIC SPACECRAFT (SEE NOTE 3) FLT-1 W TRW/GFE 1 X X X 2 X 6 X X 
S STRUCTURAL TEST MODEL STM PT TRW 1 X X 
C SOLAR ARRAY HINGE ASSEMBLY STM PT TRW 1 X 
C ALL SOLAR ARRAY HINGE ASSY. FLIGHT UNI FLT-1 F 5 
C SOLAR ARRAY RELEASE MECHANISMS FLT-1 F 1 X X 16 
= --+-_ .. 
8, Spacecraft Verification 
GEVS Traceabilitv Matrix Example (Appendix A. SY1-0013) 
x - COMPLIANCE 
E - EXCEPTION, WAIVER REQUIRED 
1- NO ANAL YSIS OR TEST PLANNED 
2-ANAL YSIS ONLY, NO TESTING PLANNED 
COMMENTS REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
• • • 
Major Verification Analyses 
• STRUCTUARAL DYNAMIC MODEL (VALIDATED ON STM) 
• THERMAL ANALYTICAL MODEL (VALIDATED BY SPACECRAFT THERMAL BALANCE) 
• COMMAND and DATA HANDLING ANALYSIS 
• ATTITUDE CONTROL and DETERMINATION ANALYSIS 
• ORBITAL ADJUST SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS 
• ALIGNMENT ANALYSIS 
• CONTAMINATION ANALYSIS 
• EMC ANALYSIS 
• SAFETY ANALYSIS ( CURRENTLY ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS) 
10, Spacecraft Verification 
--~ ... 
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Environmental Design Requirements 
• Minimum Natural Frequencies 
- SPACECRAFT > 20 Hz (PEGASUS REQUIREMENT) 
- COMPONENTS LESS THAN 30 POUNDS> 100 Hz (DERIVED) 
- COMPONENTS GREATER THAN 30 POUNDS > 40 Hz (DERIVED) 
11, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
- SOLAR ARRAY (STOWED) > 22 Hz (DERIVED) 
• Acoustics 
(DERIVED) 
Frequency 
(Hz) 
Overall 
1/3 Octave Sound 
Pressure Level (dB) 
134.2 
• • 
• • 
• Design Limit Loads Derived From Pegasus Interface Loads 
Specified In Contract 
- -"-
Pegasus XL-C 
Component and Event LtOll Aircraft 
Axial,Zs/c Lateral 
Spacecraft Structure 
Captive Flight Release ±l ±4.5, -Xs/c 
(CFR) ±l, Y s/c 
Aerodynamic Pull-up -3.65±.35 2.4±.5, -Xs/c 
±1.5, Y s/c 
Abort Landing ±0.6 2.8±.1, -X s/c 
+0.6, Y sIc 
1st Stag-e Burnout - 8 .5± 1 +1.2 
2nd Stage Burnout -11.5±1 ±1.2 
3rd Stage Burnout -9.5±1 ±1.2 
PI atform s 
Nadir (CFR) ± 1 ±4.5, -Xs/c 
+1, Y sIc 
Middle (CFR) + 1 +4.5, -Xs/c 
±1, Ys/c 
OAS (CFR) ± 1 ±4.0, -Xs/c 
±1, Y sIc 
Powered Flight'" (PF) -1l.5+2.5 +2 
(All Platforms) 
12, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
Environmental Design Requirements (Continued) 
• Random Vibration Requirement (Revised GEVS Values For Pegasus) 
.. Frequency ASD Level ( G 2 I Hz) 
(Hz) Protoflight Acceptance 
20 to 100 0.005 0.0025 
100 to 200 +SdB/octave -SdB/octave 
200 to 1250 0.02 0.01 
1250 to 2000 -SdB/octave -SdB/octave 
Overall level 5.S Grms 4.0 Grms 
13, Spacecraft VerHlcatlon 
• • • 
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·Shock Environment Issue 
• CURRENT CONTRACT SHOCK ENVIRONMENT AND PEGASUS SEPARATION TEST 
DATA DO NOT AGREE 
• ANALYSIS TO COMPARE CONTRACT VALUES AND PEGASUS TEST DATA WITH SIC 
ATTENUATION WAS DONE 
• RESULTS INDICATE COMPONENT REQUIREMENT FOR HARDWARE ON 
MID-PLATFORM IS PROBABLY ACCEPTABLE 
• OAS PLATFORM HAS SMALL ATTENUATION AND SHOCK TESTING ON 
SELECTED OAS COMPONENTS IS PLANNED 
• FINAL ASSESSMENT OF PEGASUS TEST VALUES ON THE TOMS-EP DESIGN IS 
PENDING COMPLETION OF THE SHOCK SURVEY PLANNED FOR THE STM 
IN SEPTEMBER 
14, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
--~.-. II~rtrt 
• Launch Vehicle Separation Shock Comparison 
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15, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
TOMS Component Shock Spectra (Q=1 0) 
Recommendation as of 7 May 92 
OAS platform 
mid platform 
Pegasus data at source 
EV specification 
Attenuated 
2 S 4 
102 
I 3 4 
10S 
........................ 
/'-'-'-'-'-
Recommended 
• neglact low frequency 
• It art at 1 00 Hz 
I 3 4 104 
• 
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Component Verification Versus Requirements (EV2·0030) 
Requirement 
• RANDOM VIBRATION 
• ACOUSTICS 
• DESIGN STRENGTH 
• THERMAL VACUUM 
• THERMAL CYCLING 
• SHOCK 
• PERFORMANCE 
• BURN-IN 
16, Spacecraft Verification 
Verification 
3 AXIS - PROTOFLIGHT LEVELS 
SOLAR ARRAY ONLY 
- ANALYSIS AT COMPONENT LEVEL 
- SINE BURST AT SPACECRAFT LEVEL 
- EQUIPMENT MUST PERFORM TO SPEC. 
FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENT 
- 8 CYCLES RF EQUIPMENT ONLY 
- 6 CYCLES AT SIC LEVEL SATISFIES 
TN FOR OTHER COMPONENTS 
NON-RF EQUIPMENT - 16 CYCLES 
AMBIENT PRESSURE PROTOFLIGHT 
TEMPERATURES 
- ANALYSIS AT COMPONENT LEVEL, 
EXCEPT BATTERY 
- TEST DEFERRED TO SPACECRAFT 
STM SURVEY TO MINIMIZE RISK 
- AS DEFINED BY EQ SPECIFICATIONS 
. - 300 HOURS OF OPERATING TIME 
PRIOR TO DELIVERY 
Spacecraft Verification Versus GEVS Requirements 
GEVS Requirement Verification 
• COMPREHENSIVE PERFORMANCE 
TESTS 
• ACOUSTICS 
• RANDOM VIBRATION 
• DESIGN STRENGTH And 
STRUCTURAL RELIABILITY 
• DYNAMIC MODEL VALIDATION 
• SEPARATION SHOCK 
• THERMAL VACUUM 
17, Spacecraft VerHlcatlon 
• 
3 PLANNED - ONE AS BASELINE 
ONE HOT - ONE COLD DURING THERMAL VAC. 
PERFORMED ON SOLAR ARRAY 
ONLY. WAIVER REQUEST FOR 
SPACECRAFT LEVEL TEST. 
3-AXIS PROTOFLIGHT LEVELS 
- FIXED FREQUENCY SINE TEST OF 
STM FOR PRIMARY STRUCTURE 
- REPEATED AT SPACECRAFT LEVEL FOR 
FLIGHT HARDWARE 
LOW LEVEL VIBRATION ON STM 
2 FIRINGS OF TEST PAYLOAD ADAPTER 
SUPPLIED BY OSC 
- 6 CYCLES AT SPACECRAFT LEVEL 
- ONE CYCLE USED FOR THERMAL BALANCE 
TO VALIDATE THERMAL MODEL 
• • 
r ' 
'if f 
,'/ ' 
/ 
/ 
• 
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Spacecraft Verification Vers~s Requirements (Continued) 
GEVS Requirement 
• INTERFACE ELECTRICAL TESTS 
- SPACECRAFT 
- INSTRUMENT 
- LAUNCH VEHICLE 
- UNIT LEVEL 
18, Spacecraft Verification 
Verification 
PRIMARY POWER FAULT TESTING 
SIC IIF TEST WITH INSTRUMENT 
SIMULATOR 
INSTRUMENT TEST AT ASSOCIATE 
CONTRACTOR WITH SIC SIMULATOR 
SIC LEVEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 
DURING I & T 
SIC SIDE WITH EGSE IN SIMULATED 
PRE-LAUNCH & LAUNCH CONDITIONS 
UNIT TEST SETS 
Mechanical Function Verification Versus GEVS Requirements 
GEVS Requirement 
• COMBINATION OF 
ANALYSIS & TEST 
19, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
Verification 
• KINEMATIC ANALYSIS FOR ADVERSE 
EFFECTS OF TOL. BUILD-UP, THERMAL 
DISTORTIONS, MISALIGNMENTS, 
ST ATIC/DYNAMIC DISPLACEMENTS . 
• TESTS: 
• 
HARNESS COLD TEMP RESISTANCE 
AND STORAGE 
TORQUE ANGLE MEASUREMENTS 
CLEARANCE VALIDATION 
(WALKOUT OF ARRAY THRU FULL 
DEPLOYMENT) 
NITINOL RELEASE (1 ST MOTION) 
PRE AND POST ENVIRONMENT 
LOADS VERIFIED BY DYNAMIC TEST 
AND SELECTED PULL TEST FOR 
HINGE ASSEMBLY 
• 
• 
Spacecraft Verification Versus GEVS Requirements (Continued) 
GEVS Requirement Verification 
• EMCIEMI 
• 100 HOURS OF FAilURE FREE 
PERFORMANCE 
. • lEAK TEST 
RADIATED SUSCEPTIBILITY 
TESTING AT THE SIC lEVEL 
- CONDUCTED EMISSIONS AND 
SUSCEPTiBiliTY AT COMPONENT 
lEVEL ON THE ETB 
- ANALYSIS AT COMPONENT lEVEL 
MAINTAIN SYSTEM POWERED-ON 
RECORDS DURING I & T 
OAS DURING I&T PROCESS 
20, Spacecraft Verification 
Software Verification Overview 
Tested Items 
Test Test Software Fault Pre-
Location Name Stored Telemetry Detection, Defined KPD HW/SW ACDS EPDS Cmds, Cmd Processing, Contents Interfaces Functions Functions Hardware Processing Playback SPWake- RTCSs lApp E) Cmds up Logic lApp D) 
TFS X )( X X X X Function-
. -
Level Test , 
TRW! 
CSEO TFS X X OpS Verification part part Phase A part 
Test 
ACDS 
X ACDS Software part Verification part 
Test 
Space EPDS X EPDS Software I Park 
Verification part part ETB --
Test 
TFS X X X X OpS Verification I part Phase B Test , 
I&T System Test part· part X X 
21, Spacecraft Verification 
• • • 
• • 
Major Deviations Required For GEVS Requirements 
• NO ACOUSTIC TESTING AT SPACECRAFT LEVEL, SOLAR ARRAYS ONLY 
• EMC TESTING VALUES TAILORED BY SR1-0105 FOR THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS: 
- CE01/CE03 (NARROWBAND AND BROADBAND) 
- RE02 (NARROWBAND AND BROADBAND) 
- CONDUCTED SUSCEPTIBILITY (POWERLINES) 
• 
NO ANALYSIS OR TESTS ARE PLANNED FOR GEVS PARA. 2.5.4 MAGNETIC PROPERTIES 
EXCEPT ANALYSIS FOR STRAY MAGNETIC FIELD 
• NO STRUCTURAL RELIABIL TY TESTING BEING CONDUCTED ON COMPONENTS 
• SINE SWEEP NOT BEING CONDUCTED ON SPACECRAFT 
22, Spacecraft Verification 
Candidates For Qualification By Similarity 
23, Spacecraft Verification 
• 
• THERMAL CONTROL 
- HEATERS 
- THERMOSTATS AND THERMISTORS 
- MLI 
• ACDS 
- MAGNETOMETER 
- TORQUE RODS 
- FINE AND COARSE SUN SENSORS 
• EPDS 
- BATTERY 
• C&DH 
-GSTDNTRANSPONDER 
• OAS 
- DTM SUBASSY (PARTIAL) 
- FILL & DRAIN VALVES 
- PRESSURE TRANSDUCER 
- FILTER 
- ISOLATION VALVES (PARTIAL) 
- TANK (PARTIAL) 
• • 
• 
1, EMI/EMC 
• 
TOMS-EP 
EMI/EMC Verification 
• 
R. Bal 
• • •• 
• • • 
EMC Topics of Discussion 
o EMC Objectives 
o Requirements vs Capability 
o EMC Status/Assessment 
o EMC Verification Activities 
o Problem Areas/Concerns and Resolutions 
2, EMIIEMC 
EMC Objectives 
o To achieve internal EMC between Spacecraft 
- . ,Components 
- Subsystems 
- Instrument 
o To achieve external EMC between the Spacecraft and 
- EGSE (Electrical Ground Support Equipment) 
- LVI (Launch Vehicle Interfaces) 
- Launch Site 
- Orbital Environment 
• • 
• • EMC Requirements Vs. Capability 
Requirement Capability Comment/ 
Verification method 
Primary Power Grounding/lsolation 
Primary power shall be dc isolated from Comply System impact minimal. Refer to the 
chassis/ structure of individual Except: following for details: 
components by ~ 1 Megohm. Transponder (chassis 1) TOM5-EP.91.S00.089 
return) 2) TOM5-EP.92.S00.011 
MOE (30Kn) 3) TOM5-EP.91.S00.088 
PCU / ARE (100 Kn) 4) TOM5-EP.91.S00.07S 
Interface Requirements - Orbital Operations 
Conducted Emissions, Primary Power Comply Units shall comply by similarity to 
Lines. Interference generated by units existing design or test. Xponder 
using primary power bus shall not exceed tested, Instrument, CEA and GRA 
the levels given in Figures A-1 and A-2 of unit test planned. Remaining units 
the SR1-0l0S Document. tested in ETB. 
Units shall comply by similarity to 
Radiated Emissions. Interference Comply existing design or test Xponder 
emanating from the equipment case or tested. Instrument and GRA test 
cabling shall not exceed the levels given in planned. Satellite Radiated 
Figures A-4 thru A-6 of the SR1-010S Emissions test planned. 
4, EMIIEMC 
EMC Requirements Vs. Capability (Continued) 
Requirement Capability Comment/Verification 
method 
/ 
1/ Conducted Susceptibility, Primary and Comply Units shall comply by test or similarity to 
Secondary Power Leads. Equipment existing design. Transponder tested. 
operational performance shall not be Instrument, CEA and GRA unit test 
> 
degraded when subjected to conducted planned. Remaining units tested in ETB. 
susceptibility signals having amplitude 
L shown in figures A-8 and A-9. 
/ 
,,, 
II V 
I Radiated Susceptibility. Equipment Comply Units comply by test or similarity to operational performance shall not be existing design. Transponder tested. 
degraded when subjected to the Radiated Instrument test planned. Radiated 
E-Field of 2 V 1m from 14 KHz to 2 GHz Susceptibility test planned at the Satellite 
\- and S V 1m from 2 GHz to 10 GHz. level. 
In-rush Current Comply 
Transient in-rush current drawn by Units comply by Test or similiarity to 
~ 
equipment turn-on or mode changes shall existing design. TAM In-rush Current is as 
not exceed the values shown in Table 4-1 yetTBD. 
of SR1-010S. 
• • 
• • 
EM·C Status/Assessment 
1) The following requirements were either tailored(from MIL-STD-461 
C or GEVS) or modified in the EMC Spec. since PDR. 
, a) Conducted Susceptibility Requirement (CS01/CS02). 
Tailored to TOMS-EP design based on the Bus Impedance 
Analysis. Revised susceptibility requirement to 2.0 Vp-p 
between 30 Hz and 100 KHz (Was 9.6 Vp-p), decreasing to 0.5 
Vp-p (was 2.8 Vp-p) at 20 MHz. 0.5 Vp-p between 20 MHz and 
500 MHz (was 2.8 Vp-p). 
b) Secondary Power Over-voltage requirement defined: 
+SV Output: Over-voltage up to 6.2 VDC for 20 llSec. 
6, EMlfEMC 
+ lSV Output: Over-voltage up to + 18.6 VDC for upto 20 pSec. 
Over voltage requirement based on DC-DC Converter shutoff 
capability. 
EMC Status/Assessment (Continued) 
7, EMIIEMC 
• 
c) In-rush currents associated with equipment tum-on firmed-up 
Relays switching the in-rush currents meet the derating criteria 
set forth by MIL-STD-975 except in the VDE interface. The 10 
Amp relays switches 16 A (pulse duration 6 l1sec), whereas, 
MIL-STD -975 derating requirement is 6.1 Amps. Deviation 
submitted to GSFC. TAM in-rush as yet TBD. 
d) Developed a "notch" for the Radiated Emissions (Narrowband 
and Broadband) - See Figure A-5 and A-6 in the EMC Spec. The 
notch was developed based on the Receiver sensitivity (-123 
dBm). 
e e· 
• • 
EMC Status/Assessment (Continued) 
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8, EMIIEMC 
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Figure A-5 RE02 Narrowband Emissions, Electri~ Field. 
.' 
EMC Status/Assessment (Continued) 
2} EGSE EMI/EMC Design Requirements and Guidelines. Detailed 
Grounding, Bonding, Cabling, Filtering guidelines for EGSE. (See 
TOMS-EP.91.500.057 for details). Highlights are: 
a} EGSE generated ripple shall be limited to 250 m Vp-p and the . 
,oJ .~. transients above 28 VI?C(overshoot} shall be limited to no more 
s~ than 28 V peak (duration of less than 10 ].1sec). . 
~' 
9, EMIIEMC 
b} DC power provided by EGSE to the Spacecraft shall be 
grounded at the Spacecraft only (lMQ isolation between the DC 
power return and chassis and other returns at the EGSE). 
c} Construct equipotential frameworks (Ground Reference Frames 
- Copper strips, 20 mils min. thickness and 9 inch wide), to 
which the spacecraft and the EGSE equipment shall be 
grounded}. 
• • 
• 
• • • 
EMC Status/Assessment (Continued) 
d) Power supplied by EGSE to Spacecraft shall be on twisted 
unshielded pair. Digital, data, commands, and state circuits 
. shall be on shielded twisted pair etc. 
3) Bus Impedance Characterization (TOMS-EP.92.500.024). The bus 
impedance varies from a minimum of 55 mn to a maximum of 
330 mn between 0.1 Hz and 100 KHz. Bus Impedance results 
were utilized in conjunction with the Conducted Emissions . 
requirements to tailor the Conducted Susceptibility requirement. 
10, EMI/EMC 
A maximum of 330 mn (Bus Z at 10 KHz) and a maximum of 2.2 
Amps p-p (Conducted Emissions-RSS of 10 loads at 10 KHz) 
results in a noise level of 0.74 Vp-p. The Conducted Susceptibility 
level was set at 2 Vp-p which provides a design margin of 8dB). 
TOMS-EP Bus Impedance 
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Frequency 
11, EMI/EMC 
• • • 
• • • 
EMC Verification Activities 
1) SEMCAP ANALYSIS 
12, EMI/EMC 
Completed SEMCAP (Specification Electro-Magnetic 
Compatibility Analysis Program). SEMCAP is a Air Force/NASA 
approved code. The objective is to analytically verify EMISMs 
(Electromagnetic Interference Safety Margins) between signal 
interfaces, that is , ensure that the present design (cable type, 
twisting shielding and layout) provides ample margin from cable-
to-cable coupled noise. 
SEMCAP uses electromagnetic field equations and 
capacitive/inductive coupling equations to calculate the cross-
coupling between an energy source (Generator) and a potentially 
susceptible interface (Receptor). 
EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
Modeled 10 Receptors and 4 Generators to represent majority of 
the satellite interface types. Receptors and Generator are as 
follows: 
Receptors 
1. GRA Current Telemetry 6. MDE Analog Cmd 
2. DSE Relay Status TIm 7. MDE Motor Current TIm 
3. EPDS WDT- Pulse Output 8. Serial Tim (Data) . 
4. ADE Readout Enable 
5. Special Command IfF 
9. IRSA-SCE Infrared IfF 
10. IRSA-SCE Infrared IfF 
Generators 
1. Serial Telemetry Clock (Steady state noise generator) 
2. OAS Heater turn-on (Transient noise generator) 
3. Serial Telemetry Data (Steady state noise generator) 
4. Motor Drive Current (Steady state noise generator) 
13, EMIIEMC 
• • •• 
• • EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
• II~wi 
Table below shows the margin in dB for the modeled interfaces for 
both the steady state and Transient cases. 
Receptors Steady-State 
Margin (dB) 
(RSS) 
1. GRA Current Telemetry . 13 
2. DSE Relay Status TIm 65 
3. EPDS WDT - Pulse Output 60 
4. ADE Readout Enable 70 
5. Special Command I/F 57 
6. MDE Analog Cmd 56 
7. MDE Motor Current TIm 17 
8. Serial TIm (Data) 90 
9. IRSA-SCE I/F- Infrared sig 21 
10. IRSA-SCE I/F-BDC sig 20 
14, EMIIEMC 
Transient 
Margin (dB) 
-36 
18 
16 
26 
14 
14 
-33 
55 
07 
20 
EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
Results 
Steady State Operations: Analysis shows that ample positive 
margin exists on all receptors for the steady state operations. For 
example, a 13 dB margin (RSS) exists on the GRA Current 
telemetry. This means the following: 
Threshold of sensitivity for GRA Current Telemetry was 
established as 20 m V(minimum resolution step size for a 8-bit 
telemetry word). The noise from all steady-state generators adds 
upto 4.6 m V (RSS), thus providing a 13 dB margin. 
Transient Effects: For transient event (heater tum-on) a negative 
margin exists on the GRA current telemetry (-36 dB) and the MDE 
Motor Current Telemetry (-33 dB).' Such one time erroneous 
telemetry values would be ignored, that is, time averaging of these 
parameters is required. 
15, EMI/EMC 
• • • 
• • EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
2) Magnetic Analysis. 
16, EMIIEMC 
a) The DC Magnetic field at the Instrument is 0.64 
Gauss (requirement is 1 Gauss). DC Magnetic field levels at 
the Instrument from all spacecraft contributors listed below 
add up to 238 mGauss (RSS). Earth field at the TOMS-EP 
orbit is 400 mGauss. 
1. Solar Arrays (18.3 mGauss - By Analysis) 
2. Mag. Torq. (236 mGauss - By Analysis) - ON at full Current 
3. Transponder (5.1 mGauss - By Analysis) 
4. GRA (4 mGauss - Test Data) 
5. Reaction Wheels (3 mGauss - Test Data) 
6. PCU (6.9 mGauss - By Analysis) 
7. Secondary Power structure currents (15.8 mGauss 
- By Analysis) 
8. RF Switch (17.1 mGauss - Test Data) 
9. Misc. leakage currents «1 mGauss - By Analysis) 
EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
b) DC Magnetic field requirement is 53 mGauss at the TAM for an 
earth field measurement error of 10%. DC Magnetic levels at 
the Triple Axis Magnetometer add upto 31.4 mGauss (RSS) 
from all spacecraft contributors listed below: 
1. Solar Arrays (18.3 mGauss - By Analysis) 
2. Mag. Torquers (2.4 mGauss - By Analysis)-Residual Field 
3. Transponder (5.1 mGauss - By Analysis) 
4. GRA (4 mGauss - Test Data) 
5. Reaction Wheels (3 mGauss - Test Data) 
6. PCU (6.9 mGauss - By Analysis) 
7. Sec. Pwr structure currents (15.8 mGauss-By Analysis) 
8. RF Switch (17.1 mGauss - Test Data) 
9. Misc. leakage currents «1 mGauss - By Analysis) 
TAM measurement of earth's magnetic field will be software controlled 
to be sampled only when no current is being dumped in the torque 
rods. 
17, EMIIEMC 
• • 
• 
• • • 
EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
c) Calculated the Spacecraft magnetic moment to be 0.29 Am2 (RSS) 
. from all spacecraft contributors listed below: 
1. Solar Arrays (0.081 Am2) 
2. Magnetic Torquers (0.1 Am2)-Residual moment with 
Torquers off 
3. Transponder (0.07 Am2)- Transmitter-OFF 
4. PCU (0.25 Am2) 
5. Secondary Power structure currents (0.05 Am2) 
With Transmitter-On the Transponder contribution is 0.33 Am2 and the 
magnetic moment is 0.44 Am2(RSS). 
18, EMI/EMC 
EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
3) System Level Tests 
Perform System Level EMI/EMC Tests. Testing will be shared 
between the ETB and the Satellite. Testing on ETB has the 
following advantages: 
1) Recognition and resolution of problems prior to spacecraft A&T. 
2) "Reduce TOMS-EP EMI/EMC Test time. 
The ETB and Spacecraft EMC testing will be as follows: 
- Perform the following tests on the ETB: 
- Ripple Measurement on Primary Power Bus 
- Equipment Tum-on and Tum-off Transients 
- Conducted Susceptibility-Steady State (injection level is 6 dB 
higher than the ripple measured on the primary power bus. above). 
19, EMIIEMC 
• • • 
• • • 
EMC Verification Activities (Continued) 
20, EMI/EMC 
- Conducted Susceptibility- Transient (injection level is 6 dB 
higher than the transients measured in the turn-on turn-off transients 
measured above. 
- Perform the following tests on the Satellite: 
'- Radiated Emissions 
- Radiated Susceptibility 
Problem Areas/Concerns and Resolution 
EMI/EMC Tests are performed on selected units only. EMC 
problems may be discovered during A&T, affecting schedule/cost. 
Resolution: 
An integrated Spacecraft level test (Conducted Emissions/Susceptibility) . 
is planned in ETB configuration to discover and resolve EMC problems prior to 
spacecraft integration. Radiated Emission/Susceptibility problems could still 
surface at the system level. 
21, EMIIEMC 
• • • 
• • 
TOMS-EP 
Spacecraft Integration, Test, Launch, 
and Mission Operations 
• --~ ... I~-
• 
1, Integration and Test 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Spacecraft Integration, Test, 
and 
Launch Site Activities 
• ...~ ... 
I~-
J. Durschinger 
• • • 
• 
TOMS-EP 
• 
ETB-TOMS-EP Integration and Test Schedule 
1992 1993 ACTIVITIES JlFlMlA!MlJ!J 
: : : : : : 
• 
A I s o N I 0 
EAGLE TEST BED 
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EEMTB INTEG. & TEST lil: :: : T 1 i 1 ! 1 ! ! ! ! ! 
TOMS-EP VERIFICATION 
TOMS·EP SYSTEM I&T 
OAS MOD.I&T 
CORE MOD BUILD-UP l l! l l ~ l l ! l l ! ! 
INSTRUMENT 1& T 
LAUNCH SITE OP's iii iii iii iii i L!!?l Illtttljji!!ilAU NCH 
M2M 92.149.15 
2, Integration and Test 
TOMS-EP 
Integration and Test Key Features 
• )est equipment, key procedures, critical test software verified on ETB 
• TOMS-EP engineering models verified on ETB 
• Key system analysis and software verified on ETB 
• TOMS-EP functional testing is structured as the second in a series 
• TOMS-EP is a protoflight environmental test 1& T program 
• SIC bus baseline performance verified before instrument integration 
• OAS SIS test performed at module level 
• Factory testing assures full spacecraft/instrument functionality 
requiring only aliveness test at launch site 
3, Integration and Test 
• • • 
• 
TOMS-EP 
• 
System Test Requirements Sources ,'U~Ik>L 
j} ~/ /),e; (JOC!;', ;h;;yt I ' I:/ 
• System assembly test and launch is performed in accordance with 
019251 Integration, Verification & Test Plan, CORL-IT-01 
- This is my bible ~
• IV& T plan derived from requirements in: 
. - SY1-0013 System Performance Verification Specification 
~ --
- PA1P 
- Launch Vehicle ICO (lF3-0008) 
- Instrument ICO (lF3-8007) 
- Instrument Integration and Operations Plan (019081) 
- Contamination Control Plan (019082) 
- EMI/EMC Requirements Specification and Control Plan (SR1-01 05) 
- Ground System Test Plan (019818) 
4, Integration and Test 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Test Program Structure is Derived from 
Verification Test Matrix 
~1 &sL' 
v'l 
~~ ~~\ }~h 
~ Requirement (SV1-0013) 
• Functional 
• One hundred hour failure 
free performance 
• EMC/EMI 
• Vibration 
• pyroshock 
5, Integrat.nd Test 
Capability (019251) 
Comprehensive performance test (CPT) 
• Baseline (7.3) 
• Hot and cold TN (7.17) 
• Contents defined by req uirements in SY1-0013 
Accumulated during spacecraft TN-T/B testing 
EMC test (7.6) 
• Conducted test on ETB 
• Radiated test on TOMS-EP 
Prototype 3 axis random vibration test (7.10) 
Prototype separation and array release 
s hoc k tests (7.11, 7. 12) 
• 2 actuations 
• • 
• 
TOMS-EP 
• • 
Test Program Structure is Derived from 
Verification Test Matrix (Continued) 
Requirement (SY1-0013) 
. '. Sine burst 
• Thermal vacuum 
• Thermal balance 
• Leak 
6, Integration and Test 
Capability (019251) 
Sine burst test (7.9) 
Thermal vacuum temperature cycling 
(6 cycles) (7.17) ! .tJt;(re.. to cr t1Juv nJs 
Thermal vacuum/thermal balance test (7.17) 
• Hot and cold thermal balance 
• Hot and cold CPT 
OAS leak test (7.1.3, 7.18) 
~i [\ cilA}.P" {L fe s r ((,1,<.<- "'-
CD "" rf,b, k 1; rest) () / Jl .C '11 tet1< f 
f}rv (f~d/l /5'/c) 
TOMS-EP 
Software Verification During System Test 
• Software verification is performed on the ETB 
- C & DH subsystem in phase B verification tests 
- ACDS subsystem in TOMs LFBT 
- EPDS subsystem in TOMs EPDS verification tests 
• Flight software is loaded into SP & DP EEPROMS using a Gulton 
designed loader which tests the PROMS before loading the software 
• Memory dumps during the spacecraft CPTs will verify the software 
has not been corrupted by hardware failures during environmental testing 
• Any software used in normal command and telemetry processing 
and for hardware interfaces will get exercised as part of the planned 
hardware tests in the CPT 
• Critical RTCSs (ie deploy) are verified in system I & T 
7, I_ation and Test 
• • 
• • • 
TOMS .. EP 
Integration and Test Plan 
• Component 
• Spacecraft Bus Assembly and Test 
• Instrument Installation and Integration 
• Protoflight Spacecraft Assembly and Test 
8, Integration and Test 
TOMS-EP 
Component Qualification and Acceptance 
• Specific test requirements and qualification status for each 
component are contained in SY1-0013, verification test matrix 
• Requirements are flowed down to individual suppliers 
• Test environments for each component specified in EV2-0030 
• Component functional and performance verification test 
requirements are specified in Section 4, Verification Requirements 
of the individual EQ specifications 
9, In.'on and Test 
• • 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Integration & Test Overall Flow 
• Propulsion In .. 
• Pressur. transducer 
• lsovalv" (2) 
• Fillet' 
• Fin & dulln va"," 
• Inslall thermal insulalion 
• Instal IMt battery 
• Instal .00ar arrays 
• Instal instrumentation 
• In.tall antenna. 
• Polarily check. on CSSAs 
• In,taN ,elease devices 
1-___ 5':;° 
10, Integration and Test 
• 
• Data processor 
• SIC processor 
·PCU 
·CEA 
& secondary yolagel 
• T esl procedure checkoul 
• 
• Aignments 
• Shim correc:lionl 
TOMS-EP 
OAS Subsystem Assembly and Test 
M8 7 1 1 .. M8 
INSTALL RECEIVE STRUCTURE ~ INSTALL OAS .. EQUIPMENT ON AND DISASSEMBLE PLATFORM IN MGSE .... 
_ .... OAS PLATFORM 
"" 
• INSTALL • DTMs (4) 
UMBILICAL HARNESS • OAS TANK 
• PROPULSION LINES 
RECEIVE • PRESS TRANSDUCER 
PROTOFLT/QUAL I-- • ISOVALVES (2) 
TESTED UNITS • FILTER 
• FILL & DRAIN VALVES 
RECEIVE 
ACCEPTANCE I--
TESTED UNITS 
RECEIVE OAS 
FLIGHT HARNESS t--
AFTER FACT TEST 
INITIAL INTEGRATION 
OF FLIGHT AVIONICS 
ON STM OAS MOD. 
• 
-'0. 
.... 
~ 
7.1.2 M4 
PERFORM 
THRUSTER ALIGN & 
PHOTOGRAMMETRY 
7.1.3 + M12(LEAK) 
PERFORM PROOF, 
LEAK, FLOW TESTS 
7.1.4 + 
PERFORM 
ELECTRICAL TESTS 
7.1.5 + M8 
ASSEMBLE/INSTALL 
OAS MODULE 
ON MGSE PEDESTAL 
7.1.12 + El, Ml TRANSFER AVIONICS 
HARDWARE FROM ~ STM TO FLIGHT OAS 
MODULE 
SPACECRAFT BUS 
PROCEDURES C/O (7.2) 
• 
• 
TOMS-EP 
• 
Spacecraft Bus Assembly Without OAS Ml 7.1.B El, M2 
RECEIVE STRUCTURE 
AND DISASSEMBLE 
.. 
~, MB 
INSTAll CORE 
MODULE ON MGSE 
.... 
... 
MB 
INSTAll NADIR 
PLATFORM IN MGSE 
RECEIVE QUAL, 
PROTOFl T, ACCEPT 
TESTED UNITS 
RECEIVE 
FLIGHT HARNESS 
AFTER FACT TEST 
.... .... 
... ... 
.. 
... 
7.1.6 ~, M1 
INSTAll UNITS AND 
CABLES ON +Z SIDE 
OF NADIR PLATFORM 
• STRIP HEATERS (2) 
• THERMOSTATS (4) 
• CONNECTOR 
ifF BRACKET 
• FSSAs (2) 
..------"'"t 
INSTAll AVIONICS MATE CORE MOOUlE ... HARDWARE ON ~ ... AND OAS MODULE STM OAS MODULE 
• EED DRIVER 
• TORGUE ROD 
• VDEs (2) 
• SOLAR ARRAY 
REGULATORS (2) 
7.1.6 Ml 
INSTAll UNITS AND _DC 
--. CABLES ON -Z SIDE J-------INTEGRATION 
OF NADIR PLATFORM -(7.1.9) 
• THERMISTORS (5) 
• CONNECTOR IIF BRKT 
• GRAs (3) 
• SCAN WHEELS (2) 
• MAGNETOMETER 
ELEX AND SENSOR 
• REACTION WHEEL 
• RF ASSEMBLY (1) 
• TRANSPONDERS (2) 
7.1.1 Ml 7.1.1 Ml 
~ INSTAll UNITS AND INSTAll UNITS AND 
CABLES ON -Z SIDE --. CABLES ON +Z SIDE 
L..----------------------... ~OF CENTRAL PlTFRM OF CENTRAL PlTFRM 
1) THERMOSTAT AND HEATER WIRING TESTED AS PART OF INSTALLATION PROCEDURE • STRIP HEATERS (2) 
• THERMOSTATS (4) 
• THERMOSTATS (5) 
• DATA PROCESSOR . 
2) UNIT BONDING TESTED AS PART OF BOX INSTALLATION PROCEDURE • TORGUE RODS (2) • SIC PROCESSOR (2) 
• PCU 
• CEA 
12, Integration and Test 
TOMS-EP 
Spacecraft Bus Integration and Test 
7.1.9 El. E13. E19. STP 7.1.10 El.MS.M4 
{ --. ELECT INTERCONN CLOSE OPEN =: NADIR & CENTRAL' ~ NADIR ~ NADIR PLATFORMS & OAS PLATFORM PLATFORM 
• DC INTEGRATION OF • HARNESS • SHIM 
PRIMARY AND FIT CHECK CORRECTIONS 
SECONDARY VOLTAGES 
• ALIGNMENTS 
• TEST PROCEDURE 
CHECKOUT 
• EGSE CHECKOUT 
• NADIR INSTALLED "OPEN" 
7.1.11 E3 
13, Integen and Test 
INSTRUMENT ~ 
INSTALLATION .....----
(7.4) 
COMPLETE 
POLARITY TEST 
• 
7.1.1 
PERFORM INITIAL ~ POLARITY CHECKS 
• GRAs 
• SCAN WHEELS 
• FSSAs 
• TORQUE ROD 
• MAGNETOMETER 
ELEX AND SENSOR 
• REACTION WHEEL 
7.1.10 MS.M4 
E3 
OAS MODULE 
ASSEMBLED AND 
INTEGRATED 
7.2~' ~, STP 
PERFORM 
SPACECRAFT BUS roo-
PROCEDURES C/O 
• EGSE CHECKOUT 
• RONeY MGT/RCTS CIO 
7.3 E9. El0 
CLOSE ~ 
NADIR PLATFORM' 141""1--01 
PERFORM 
BASELINE CPT 
• FINAL ALIGNMENT 
CHECKS 
• 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Comprehensive Performance Test (CPT) Contents 
. 
• Performed to demonstrate satisfactory operation of spacecraft hardware 
• Performed as close as practical to flight configuration 
- No solar arrays 
- Hardline power connection 
- Sensor stimulation (light sources, earth rotation, earth magnetic field) 
.. Tests performed in prime, redundant, and cross strapped configurations 
• Communication transponder 
- Receiver thresholds 
- U/L and OIL modulation indexs 
- RF output power and spurs 
- OIL frequency stability 
• C&OH digital 
- Command reception, execution and verification 
- On board memory loads 
- Telemetry data rates"modulation and format reprogramming 
- Data record and playback 
- Post separation stored command sequences 
14, Integration and Test 
TOMS-EP 
CPT Contents (Continued) 
• EPDS 
- SAR functional 
- Converter outputs 
- PCU load switching 
- Solar array release driver functions 
• ACDS 
- Earth sensor, sun sensor and Gyro (earth rate) stimulation 
- Magnetometer stimulation (earth magnetic field) and torque rod response 
- Reaction wheel, scan wheels, and gyro run up/down 
- Thruster pulsing 
• Special tests 
- Launch sequence . 
- Instrument SOH and performance (instrument contracts) tests 
- Operation of spacecraft at high and low bus voltage 
- Hardware driven redundancy switchovers 
15, Integration and Test 
• • • 
• 
TOMS-EP 
TOMS Instrument to Bus 
Installation and Integration 
RECEIVE 
INSTRUMENT 
• CLEAN CONTAINER 
• MOVE TO INT. AREA 
• CHECK SHOCK DATA 
• REMOVE COVER 
• TRANSFER TO DOLLY 
• VISUAL INSPECTION 
INSTRUMENT 
RECEIVING 
CHECKOUT 
• VERIFY SAFE 
TRANSPORTATION 
• GSFC CERTIFY READINESS 
FOR INTEGRATION 
PERFORMED OFFLINE 
16, Integration and Test 
• 
7.4 M9 7.4 E9 
MECHANICAL 
INTEGRATION 
VERI FY POWER I--I~ CIRCUIT INTERFACES 
• INSTALL INSTRUMENT 
• ESTABLISH PURGE 
• INSTRUMENT ALIGNMENT 
TO SIC CONTROL AXIS 
7.6 7.5 El0, E19 (PARTIAL) 
INSTRUMENT 
~-...... FUNCTIONAL AND 
RADIOMETRIC TESTS 
• FUNCTIONAL TEST 
• INTEGRATED BUSI 
INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONS 
• SCIENCE MODE 
• INSTRUMENT 
CONTINGENCY MODES 
• BASELINE STIMULUS DATA 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Instrument Integration Highlights 
• Post shipment inspection and preparations for installation are performed 
in class 100 bench as required 
• Instrument and spacecraft interfaces previously checked using 
appropriate spacecraft and instrument simulators 
• The instrument is mechanically mated and power interface checks 
made through breakout boxes (BOB) 
• After initiall/F check, flight connections are made 
• Instrument alignment reference is measured relative to the gyros 
alignment reference within 0.01 degree 
• Functional and radiometric tests are performed using the IGSE, 
instrument stimulus light source, and spacecraft GTS 
• The TOMS-EP spacecraft is now completely integrated and ready to start 
environmental testing 
17, Integration and Test 
• • • 
• TOMS-EP 
Protoflight Test 
M17, M24 
• 
E7 
SOLAR ARRAY ASSY AND 
HINGE DEPLOYMENT 
TESTS 
t--_~I PERFORM SOLAR ARRAYS 
ILLUMINATION TEST 
INSTRUMENT 
INTEGRATION 
Mil, MS 
7.6 
PERFORM EMC TEST 
-INSTALL S·BAND ANTENNAS 
- PERFORM RADIATED 
SUSCEPTIBILITY TESTS 
7.10 MS, Ml0 
-BASELINE 
7.7 Ell, E14 
PERF TOMES·EP GSTN 
COMPAU POCC 
END·TO·END TESTS 
7.11 M6,MS 
PERFORM SINE 
BUST TESTS 
t-__ ~PERFORM 3·AXIS RANDOM t-_~I 
VIBRATION TESTS 
PERFORM PYRO 
SHOCK TEST 
- POWER ON,LAUNCH MODE, 
MONITOR TELEMETRY 
7.13 
REMOVE SOLAR 
ARRAYS FROM SIC 
AND INSTALL ON STM 
7.21 E7. MS 
INSTALL SOLAR 
ARRAYS AND VERIFY 
CONNECTIVITY 
- SIA FLASH TEST 
- SIA FIRST MonON TEST 
-INSTALL RELEASE DEVICES 
18, Integration and Test 
- POWER ON, LAUNCH MODE. - FIT CHECK ON PAF 
MONITOR TELEMETRY - SIC SEPARATION (2 TIMES, 
- POWER ON. LAUNCH MODE. 
MONITOR TELEMETRY 
7.16 114, M3, Ell 7.17 El0, E12 
PERFORM THERMAL PERFORM THERMAL 
VACUUM PREPARATIONS t--_~I VACUUM/BALANCE TEST 
- RECONDITION TEST BATTERY 
-INSTALLINSTRUMENTA nON 
-INSTALL SIC IN CHAMBER 
7.14 M23 
PERFORM ACOUSTIC 
TEST ON SOLAR ARRAYS 
7.22 M13,MS 
PERFORM MASS 
PROPERTIES 
VERIFICATION 
-WEIGHT 
-CG 
- THERMAL BALANCE 
- HOT AND COLD CPT 
- TN PERFORMANCE 
~lS M7 
PERFORM S/A FIRST 
MOTION TEST ON STM 
PREPAREFOR 
SHIPMENT 
7.S ES, M3, MS, MS, M24 
PERFORM DYNAMICS 
TEST PREPARATIONS 
-INSTALL THERMAL INSULA TlON 
-INSTALL TEST BATTERY 
-INSTALL SOLAR ARRAYS 
-INSTALL INsmUMENTATION 
-INSTALL ANTENNAS 
- POLARITY CHECKS ON CSSAs ./ 
1.12 
PERFORM SOLAR 
ARRAY RELEASE TEST 
M7 
- SIDE PANELS: FULL DEPLOYMENT 
- CENTER PANELS: FIRST MOTION 
7.1S 
7.13 
REMOVE SOLAR 
ARRAYS FROM STM 
SHIP TO WFF 
M12 
(cl--' 
~ tv s ~:il /1 Vi' ( l~tR# 
114, M3,STP 
INSTALL FLIGHT 
BATTERY 
-LAUNCH CONFIGURATION 
- DRY RUN LAUNCH PROCEDURES 
- RECONDITION fliGHT BATTERY 
7.20 E7 
PERFORM SOLAR 
ARRAYS FLASH TEST 
TOMS-EP 
TOMS-EP Protoflight Test Highlights 
• Initial GSTN compatibility and pace end-to-end test provides early check of 
ground operations interface and pace software 
- Final checks performed at launch site to verify pace fixes 
• Dynamic Tests 
- Spacecraft power-on, launch configuration (electrical and mechanical) with 
EGSE T -a umbilical connected 
-Interleave random vibration and sine burst on each axis to minimize test 
set-ups 
- Flight PAF fit check perfomed during TN test preparations 
- Test PAF used for shock test 
- Solar array acoustic test performed offline on STM structure after spacecraft 
shock test 
19, Integration and Test 
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• 
TOMS-EP 
• 
TOMS-EP Protoflight Test Highlights 
(Continued) 
• Thermal vacuum/balance test summary 
- Test consists of six thermal cycles (one for thermal balance) 
- Solar arrays will be removed before TN 
- Test heaters are installed on the spacecraft side panels to simulate 
orbital heat inputs 
- Test heaters are adjusted to drive as many boxes as practical to their minimum 
and maximum protoflight temperature limits on each cycle 
• 
- Data from the thermal balance test is used to validate the analytical thermal model 
- Spacecraft and instrument comprehensive performance tests will be 
performed at hot and at cold conditions 
- Spacecraft and instrument powered on in a baseline configuration with monitoring 
of SOH telemetry during all cycles 
20, Integration and Test 
TOMS-EP 
Spacecraft Alignments 
• The nadir platform mounted alignment cube is the reference for component 
alignments 
• All critical alignment components are attached to the same platform providing 
a' stable base and eliminating the need for post dynamic test flight alignment 
measurements 
• Shimming required to meet installation tolerances for the following 
components: 
- Gyro reference assemblies (3) 
- Scanning wheels (2) 
- Fine sun sensors (2) 
- Instrument 
~ Reaction wheel assembly 
• STM Confirms the overall spacecraft structural stability after dynamic 
environment exposure and validates the "one-G" nadir platform "droop" error 
. analysis 
21, Integration and Test 
• • • 
• 
TOMS-EP 
22, Integration and Test 
• • 
Launch Site Operations 
• Launch Site Flow 
• Launch Site Requirements 
• Open Issues 
TOMS-EP 
TOMS-EP Payload Processing Area Activities 
5.3 
SHIP 
SPACECRAFT 
5.1 
RECEIVE SET UP, 
& CHECK OUT EGSE 
5.5.7 .. 
EGSE CONNECTION 
TO SPACECRAFT 
5.5.8 + 
LAUNCH SITE 
FUNCTIONAL TEST 
A ...II1II 
START 
I 
I 5.4 
t ~ OFF LOAD ACFT 
~ AND TRANSPORT 
SIC TO VAB 
·DAY2 
I 5.5.5 I 
.. l CORE MODULE AIR CONDITIONING 
"'" ATIACHMENT 
5.5.9 
BATIERY 
.... RECONDITIONING 
.... 
iii.. (2 CYCLES) 
.... 
'~\ \\!c~pj 
,~ 
23, Integralnd Test 
~ 
.... 
..... 
"'" 
.... 
.... 
5.5.1 
MOVE 
SPACECRAFT 
INTO PLPB 
5.5.4 
SOLAR ARRAY 
INSPECTION 
5.5.10, 5.5.11 
TOMS-EP/GSTDN/POCC 
COMPAT/ETE TEST 
iii.. ... 
i 
NASA CTV SETUP 
AND CHECKOUT 
• 
DAY1 
I 
I 5.5.2 
l~ REMOVE SHIPPING 
... CONTAINER LID f--
~, 
CLEAN SIC COVER 
MOVE TO 10K 
ENCLOSURE 
5.5.3 
SPACECRAFT 
.. RECEIVING ~ "'" INSPECTION 
5.5.12 
DISCONN EGSE & 
~ RECONFIG FOR A~ LV PROCESSING 
I 
I 
I 
DAY7 
l ~ BATT R ~ P CHA GING SIC OWERED 
• 
• 
TOMS-EP 
TOMS-EP Fueling and 
• 
Launch Vehicle Mating Activities 
DAYB 
5.5.13 : 561562 .. , .. 563 . . 
MOVE SIC t~ SPACECRAFT PROPELLANT TO PROPELLANT FUELING .... LOADING AND --,.. ,.. 
LOADING AREA PREPARATIONS PRESSURIZATION 
.. 5.6.1 .j~ 
PPLS AND PACU 
CHECKOUT 
DAY" 
5.6.7 I 5.6.6 I 
SIC TO LV t SIC TO LV MECHANICAL ..... ELECTRICAL 
...... 
MATING MATING 
~~ .ijt. 
24, Integration and Test 
• 
DAY 10 
: 564 . . 
t MOVE SIC TO ~ LV PROCESSING 
--,.. 
CLN ENCLOSURE 
~ PPLS PURGE 
.. AND DECOMTAM 
5.6.5 
FINAL PRE-MATE 
..... CLOSE-OUT & .... (""'IJ ..... 
INSPECTION 
5.5.6 
LAUNCH VEHICLE 
INTERFACE DATA 
VALIDATION CHK 
CONNECT TOMS-EP 
EGSE, POWER OFF 
TOMS-EP 
Post Mate to Launch Activities 
5.6.8 569 .. 569 . . 
POWER UPTOMS-EP III. LV - SIC I/F CHECKS III. TOP OFF BATIERY CNFRM CORRECT SOH III. 
AND CORE MODULE AC .. AND SIC CONFIG FOR .. CHARGE AS REOUIRED ... TLM FROM PEGASUS I--
III.. MINIMUM LOAD ...II1II III.. ...II1II III.. .... 
DAYf2 
5.6.10 I 5.6.11 5.6.11 
4 SIC CLOSE-OUT t~ FAIRING CONNECT FAIRING TRANSPORT TO ~ PURGE AND ~ CARRIER ACFT AND TERMINATE BATI CHG ~ INSTALLATION .. .. r----AIR CONDITIONING MECH MATE 
DISCONNECT TOMS AC & EGSE 
5.7.2 lVIS VIA LAND lINES]4 5.7.2 
DISCONNECT ... ElECTRICALLY CONFIRM SIC - SECURE P/L CLEAN ENCLOSURE 4 MATE PEGASUS ... PEGASUS SOH TLM III. AROUND FAIRING. OPEN FAIRING I--TRAILER AC SERVICE ,... ,... ... TO ACFT POWER 
.... 
ATMCR ~ ACCESS PORT .... 
5.7.3 5.7.4 
~ ADJUST ACFT POWER III. INSTALL BATIERY .... RECHARGE/TOP OFF 
CON FIG SIC FOR 
~ LAUNCH AND BATIERY TO BATIERYVOLTAGE ,... AND SOLAR ARRAY IFJs ,... TOMS-EPBATI .. I-
.... II... ...II1II II... ...II1II III.. TRICKLE CHARGE ...II1II 
I......:: 1 fHR ~I 1 I...:: 1 fHR :.-1 1 
5.7.4 5.7.5 5.7.6 
INITIATE SPACECRAFT [ J 4 PRElAUNCH SOH. ... AIRCRAFT FLIGHT ... LAUNCH ... TO DROP POINT ,. III.. CONFIRM TLM AT MCR .... 
.... ... ~~~GING/ 
'" 
I......:: fHR ~I DISCONN LVIS 1 i S C POWERED I
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• • • 
• 
TOMS-EP 
• • 
TOMS-EP LV Spacecraft Power Requirements 
Activity Function GSE and Access 
Post mate SIC IIF checks Supply primary SIC bus power TOMS-EP PCMTS in VAB 
for interface tests, battery at pass thru IIF 
trickle charging connector P2 in LN 
Transport to flight line and None, TOMS battery charged, none 
mate to carrier aircraft open circuit 
Battery top off charge and Supply primary SIC bus power Adjustable regulated GFE 
configure SIC for launch for launch loads and battery power supply in L 1011 with 
charge access at the LPO panel 
Takeoff & captive flight Same as above Same as above 
Powered flight None None 
26, Integration and Test 
TOMS-EP 
TOMS-EP LV Telemetry Verification 
Monitor Requirements 
Activity Function 
Post mate SIC IIF checks Monitor LJV IIF SIC 
SOH telemetry 
Flight line mate to aircraft Monitor LJV IIF SIC 
power thru final launch SOH telemetry 
config uration 
Takeoff and captive flight Same as above 
Powered flight Same as above 
Equipment Required 
Pegasus S3 Mux, TLM EGSE, 
and P/L display console in MCR 
Same as above 
Same as above 
Same as above 
• SOH functions are all functions on the Pl LJV IIF connector being routed 
to the Pegasus S3 Mux 
27, Integr. and Test 
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• 
TOMS-EP LV PCU Command and Status 
Verification Requirements 
Activity Function GSE 
Post mate SIC Command PCU, TOMS-EGSE 
configuration checks check relay status and LVIS in VAB 
Transport to flight line None None 
and mate to carrier 
aircraft 
Configure SIC for Command PCU, TOMS-EGSE in 
launch check relay status VAB, LVIS in 
. carrier aircraft 
Takeoff and captive None None 
flight 
Powered flight None None 
Access 
Pass thru ifF connector 
P2 & P3 on lJV 
None 
Pass thru connector on 
lJV thru PCA LPO panel 
None 
None 
• LVIS used in carrier aircraft only for preflight operations and removed prior to takeoff 
28, Integration and Test 
TOMS-EP 
29, Integrl and Test 
TOMS-EP Ground Support 
Equipment 
• MGSE 
• EGSE 
• • 
•• 
TOMS-EP 
• 
Mechanical Ground Support Equipment 
• Spacecraft and solar array dollies 
• Spacecraft rotation, rate and vibration fixtures (3) 
• Alignment adapter 
.. 
• Nadir platform pivot strongback 
• Spacecraft covers 
• Solar Array Protective Covers (6) 
• Shipping container 
• Shipping container air conditioner 
• Core module air conditioner 
• Vertical and Horizontal sling 
• Propellant and pressurant loading system 
30, Integration and Test 
• 
TOMS-EP 
EGSE Subsystem (Ground Test System) 
Major Components 
• System Test Controller (STC) 
• Automated Test Sets 
Power and Control/Monitor Test Set (PCMTS) 
- Telemetry and Command Test Set (TCTS) 
- Radio Frequency Test Set (RFTS) 
• Ancillary Equipment (supplied with above test sets) 
- Diode Isolation Unit (DIU) 
- In-Flight-Jumper (IFJ) Simulator 
- Deployment Device Load Simulator (DDLS) 
- Remote Interface Unit (RIU) 
• Test Battery (Battery Simulator Console) 
• Manual Test Sets 
- Spacecraft Interface Simulator (SIS) 
- Instrument Interface Simulator (liS) 
• Instrument Ground Support Equipment (IGSE) [GFE] 
31, Integ.n and Test 
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TOMS·EP 
Integrated Test Configuration 
SYSTEM 
TEST 
CONTROLLER 
32, Integration and Test 
ETHERNET 
SOLAR 
BATTERy··""· ........ • .. 
POWER .. "'~ ..... "~ 
DIODE 
ISOLATION 
UNIT 
POWER & MAIN BUS POWER 
CONTROUMONITOR r--~;.;...;...=~':"'::'::':'::'::'--" 
IN-FLIGHT-
JUMPER 
SIMULATOR TEST SET 
TEST BA TTERY I--~ 
SENSORIMONITOR LINES 
MAIN BUSPWR 
BATTERY 
DEPLOYMENT SIG MON DEPLOYMENT 
--======= ...... t-~...=.;;...:.:.::.:::.:.:..=~:!!--I DEVICE LOAD ..... ~DE=P..;;L:.;;O..:.:YM:::.:E:::.N:.:.T-=S::.::IG::S-l 
r SIMULATOR 
..... t-_R_F_C_M;.,.D;..;,fT.;;;;LM.:.:...=U:.::NK~~~ REMOTE INTFC RF CMDfTLM LINK UNIT ..... F~:.=.:..:.==-=.:.:::.!.a~ 
INSTRUMENT 
INTERFACE 
SIMULATOR 
HARDLINECM 
SPACECRAFT 
INTERFACE 
SIMULATOR 
. INSTRUMENT n81J1'MbiMONITOR 
TOMS-EP 
SIC BUS 
TOMS·EP 
System Test Controller 
Functional Capabilities 
• Execute automated test sequences (ATSs) 
• Keyword library 
• Spacecraft commanding (via the TCTS) 
- Command effects 
- Command constraints 
• Telemetry processing 
- Limit checking 
- Alarm processing of telemetry parameters 
• Windows MMI for test execution 
- Alarm monitoring 
- Page/plot 
- Displays 
- Scrolling history 
• Test history data archiving and analysis tools 
• Spacecraft memory load and dump 
• Data base driven system 
33, Integration and Test 
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TOMS-EP 
Power & Control/Monitor Test Set 
Functional Capabilities 
• Supply external power 
- Diode isolated to SARs 
- Main bus via LV I/F or battery IFJ 
• Charge/recondition battery 
• Monitor bus voltage & battery volt/current/temp 
• Simulate spacecraft IFJs 
• Simulate deployment device loads 
• Monitor deployment signals to specified thresholds 
• Monitor thruster valve drive signals to specified thresholds 
• Simulate earth sensor & sun sensor (fine and coarse) signals 
• Generate UV/OV detector trigger signal to PCU 
• Provide launch vehicle interface functions 
• Built-in self-test 
34, Integration and Test 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Telemetry & Command Test Set 
Functional Capabilities 
• Commanding 
- STDN compatible, hardline or via RFTS 
- Accept command data from STC 
- Command echo checking 
• Telemetry 
- STDN compatible, hardline or via RFTS 
- Process clear text·telemetry for transmission to STC 
. - Telemetry sync status to STC 
- Extract instrument data & output to IGSE 
• Convolutional encoding/decoding 
• Spacecraft processor hardline enable & standby mode control 
interfaces 
• Archiving & self-test capability 
35, Integration and Test 
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TOMS-EP 
Radio Frequency Test Set 
Functional Capabilities 
• S-band (uplink/downlink) RF links 
• Ranging tones 
• Receives and demodulates telemetry subcarrier 
• RF measurements 
,w - Power 
- Frequency 
- Spectral purity 
- Modulation index 
- Time delay 
• II~wi 
• Measure command receiver sensitivity via power and frequency 
,control of RF uplink 
• Modulation index adjustment capability 
36, Integration and Test 
• 
1, Mission Ops 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Mission Operations 
• 
T. Watson 
• • .' • 
• • • 
Presentation Outline 
• Flight Operations Concept 
• Data Flow Overview 
• Uplink Activities/Command Types/Dumps 
• Science Capture 
• Routine Pass 
• Routine 24 Hour Activities 
• Contingency Operations 
2, Mission Ops 
Flight Operations Concept 
• Early Mission 
- Maximum ground station coverage, short contacts 
- Twenty-four hour/day support 
- Autonomous deployment 
- .. Autonomous initial ascent burns 
- Intensive orbit determination activities 
- Subsystem activation and checkout 
• Routine Operations 
- Nadir pointed using scan wheels 
3, Mission Ops 
• 
Five to 8 contacts per day, 10-12 minutes each 
Stored commands to perform most spacecraft and instrument 
operations 
Twenty-four hour/day support . 
Science data capture and Level 0 processing 
No attitude maneuver or orbit adjust requirements 
• • 
• • • 
TOMS-EP Command and Telemetry Flow 
D NASA ~ TRW ~ GE 
- - - - - - , TEST & LAUNCH SUPPORT ONLY 
4, Mission Ops 
Uplink Activities 
• Real Time Commands 
- Early mission subsystems configuration 
- Link management 
- Mass memory playbacks 
• Absolute Time Commands (ATCs) 
- Ascent ~ Vs and maneuver activities 
- Link management 
- Orbital event control - instrument cals, lunar eclipse 
requirements, etc. 
- RTCS activations 
• Relative Time Command Sequences (RTCSs) 
- Deployment 
- Autonomous ascent 
- Safe mode configurations 
- Link management 
- Repetitive operations 
5, Mission Ops 
• • • 
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Uplink Activities (Continued) 
• Memory Loads 
- Attitude initialization 
- Ephemeris 
:- Attitude and L\ V maneuver targets 
- Alignments and gains "tweaking" (key parameters data base) 
• Details of specific operations will be provided in "Initial Activation 
and Checkout Procedures," MO-OS. 
6, Mission Ops 
• 
TOMS-EP Command Format 
Bit Sync Trans Command Sync 
128 Bits 
All 1 's 
BIT #: 
1 
Spacecraft 
Address (7) 
SP 
Select (1) 
9 
Command 
Type (4) 
13 
Command Block 
Command 2 
48 Bits 
Command Format 
17 25 
Special 
Parameters (4) 
Command: Command 
Number / Data (8) : Parameters / Data (16) 
Post-Amble 
48 Bits, All 1 's 
41 48 
Hamming Code (7) 
1010111 o Primary , / t 
1 Redundant 
Hex: 0 Reserved 
1 Real-time 
2 ATC 
7, Mission Ops 
• 
3 Spare 
4 RTCS 
5 KPD Load 
6 SP Data Load 
7 SP Code Load 
8 DP Data Load 
9 DP Code Load 
A Manage CIB 
B-E Spare 
F Special H/W Cmd 
Hex: 0 Continue Cmd 
1 End of Cmd, Type = 0 - 4, A - F 
2 RTCS Reference 
3 ClearCIB 
4 Transfer CIB 
5 Reset CIB Cmd Cntr 
6 Restart CIB Load 
7 End of Cmd, 1 Data Byte, Type = 5 - 9 
8 End of Cmd, 2 Data Bytes, Type = 5 - 9 
9 End of Cmd, 3 Data Bytes, Type = 5 - 9 
• 
V 
On-board Storable Data Fixed Bit "0" 
• 
• • • 
Real-Time Commands 
Real-time commands consist of only the basic command structure. 
,Command Special 
Type Parameter Uplink Data 
1 1 00 
Sample 2-Byte Real-Time Command Upload 
Command Data Command Special Type Parameter 
1 0 
1 1 
Sample 4-Byte Real-Time Command Upload 
8, Mission Ops 
Absolute Time Command Definition 
• COMMANDS WITH UTC TIME TAGS WHICH CAN PERFOM OPERATIONS BASED ON 
ORBITAL POSITION. 
• TIME-TAGGED TO NEAREST SECOND. 
• AN ATC CAN BE USED TO CONTROL AN RTCS OR ISSUE A REAL TIME COMMAND. 
• ATCs WILL PROVIDE THE MANAGEMENT OF ROUTINE ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS. THE RTCSs 
WILL PROVIDE THE DETAILED COMMAND SEQUENCES. 
• AN ATC CAN BE CREATED, DELETED, AND DUMPED FOR GROUND VERIFICATION. 
• CAPABILITY IS PROVIDED FOR 512 ATCs IN THE COMMAND STORAGE AREA (CSA). 
• AFTER AN ATC HAS TIMED OUT, THAT COMMAND SLOT BECOMES AVAILABLE FOR 
ADDITIONAL ATCs TO BE UPLINKED. 
• GROUND OPERATIONS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT SPACE IN THE GSA 
FOR REQUIRED RTCSs. 
9, Mission Ops 
• • • 
• • • 
Absolute Time Commands (ATCs) 
ATCs contain a 5-byte time tag with 1~second resolution, followed by a basic command. 
Absolute-Timed Command Structure 
The time tag and command number in an ATC load must begin in the first byte of the 
uplink data area. 
. Command Data Command Special Type Parameter 
2 0 
2 0 
2 1 
Sample 2-Byte ATC and Time Tag Upload 
10, Mission Ops 
Command Storage Area (CSA) Dump 
DUMP 
10 
INDEX#O EXECUTE TIME 1 CMD# RTCS# 
INDEX#2 EXECUTE TIME 2 CMD# RTCS# 
INDEX#9 EXECUTE TIME 3 CMD# RTCS# 
INDEX#5 EXECUTE TIME 4 CMD# CMDARGS. RTCS# 
INDEX # N EXECUTE TIME 5 CMD# RTCS# 
I 
I 
I 
. I 
NOTES: 
1) COMMANDS ARE NOT NECESSARILY STORED IN THE ORDER THEY WILL EXECUTE. 
2) DUMP 10 = 04 (HEX) = CSA DUMP. 
3) DUMP WILL REPEAT FROM SYNC UNTIL DUMP HALTED. 
4) N = 512 CMOS MAXIMUM, INCLUDING ATC'S AND ANY ACTIVATED RTCS'S. 
5) RTCS # = 1 TO 255 IF CMD IS FROM AN RTCS. 0 = ATC. 
6) POINTER CONTAINS INDEX NUMBER OF NEXT CMD TO EXECUTE. 
7) INDEX 0 IS ALWAYS CONTAINS NEXT PENDING CMD. 
8) POINTER = 0 MEANS THIS INDEX NUMBER IS AVAILABLE FOR OVERWRITE. 
9) POINTER = -1 MEANS THIS INDEX NUMBER IS LAST CMD IN CSA. 
• The complete CSA can be dumped in approximately 6 minutes in the Computer Dump 
Telemetry Format (assumes 22 bytes/minor frame of dump data). 
11, Mission Ops 
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POINTER 
POINTER 
POINTER 
POINTER 
POINTER 
POINTER 
• 
• 
Relative Time Command 
Sequence Definition 
• • 
• LIST OF COMMANDS AND DELTA TIME TAGS TO PROVIDE SEQUENCES OF ACTIVITIES WITH 
PREDETERMINED TIME SPACINGS. 
• TIME TAGS ARE IN WHOLE SECONDS, VALUES FROM 0 TO 65,535. 
• MOST COMMAND FUNCTIONS CAN BE CONTROLLED BY AN RTCS. SOME EXCEPTIONS: 
- SPECIAL HARDWARE COMMANDS 
- RTCS LOADS 
- CIB OPERATIONS 
EXAMPLE - RTCS 26, ROUTINE TOMS SCAN: 
DELTA T (SECONDS) .x.C~O!.:.!M!.:.!M~AN!...!.:D~ _______ _ 
o SELECT NORMAL SCAN MODE 
4140 SELCT STANDBY MODE 
2100 EXECUTE RTCS 26 
12, Mission Ops 
ELAPSED TIME 
00:00:00 
01 :09:00 
01 :44:00 
RTCS Operational Aspects 
• AN RTCS CAN BE EXECUTED BY: 
- REAL TIME COMMANDS 
- ABSOLUTE TIME (STORED) COMMANDS 
- SPACECRAFT PROCESSER WAKE-UP/SAFING LOGIC 
- ANOTHER RTCS 
- BY ITSELF (REPEAT FUNCTION) 
- TOMS-EP FLIGHT SOFTWARE ROUTINES 
• AN RTCS CAN BE INHIBITED/ENABLED, EXECUTED/HALTED. RTCSs IN PROGRESS ARE 
TERMINATED ON SP SWITCH-OVER. 
• ACTIVATION OF AN RTCS CREATES ABSOLUTE TIME COMMANDS WHICH ARE MERGED WITH 
PREVIOUSLY EXISTING ATCs. 
• AN RTCS CAN BE CREATED, DELETED, EDITIED, AND DUMPED FOR GROUND VERIFICATION. 
• CAPABILITY FOR UP TO 255 RTCSs IS PROVIDED. 
• A MAXIMUM OF 512 COMMANDS CAN BE STORED IN AN RTCS (LIMITED BY SIZE OF STORED 
COMMAND STORAGE AREA (CSA). 
• TOTAL NUMBER OF RELATIVE TIME COMMAND STORAGE IS 1024 COMMANDS. 
• A DEFAULT SET OF RTCSs IS PROVIDED AT SP WAKE-UP FOR KEY EVENTS SUCH AS 
DEPLOYMENT & SAFE MODE SEQUENCES. 
13, Mission Ops 
• • • 
• 
Relative Time Command 
Sequences (RTCSs) 
• 
An RTCS is a sequence of basic commands (RTCs) with specified time i.ntervals, in 
seconds, between their execution times. 
Sequence xx 
RTC1 
RTC2 
RTCN 
14, Mission Ops 
• 
• 
• 
Relative-Timed Command Sequence Structure 
• 
Relative Time Command 
Sequences (RTCSs) (Continued) 
An RTeS reference must precede an RTeS upload. 
The time tag and command number in an RTeS load must begin in the first byte of the 
uplink data area. 
Command Special 
Type Parameter Command Data 
3 2 Sequence Number RTe Number 
3 0 
3 1 
3 0 
3 0 
3 1 
3 0 
3 0 
3 1 
Sample 3-Command RTCS Upload 
15, Mission Ops 
• • • 
• • 
RlCS Dump ii~n 
RTC#: SYNC = EB90 (HEX) DUMP ID RTCS# TtF FLAG 
1 DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
2 DEL TA TIME-TAG CMD# 
3 DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
4 DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
5 DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
6 DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
DELTA TIME-TAG CMD # 
DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
N DELTA TIME-TAG CMD# 
NOTES: 
1) DUMP ID = 03 (HEX) = RTCS DUMP. 
2) DUMP WILL REPEAT FROM SYNC UNTIL DUMP HALTED. 
3} TRUE/FALSE FLAG INDICATES ENABLED/INHIBITED, RESPECTIVELY. 
4) N = 512 COMMANDS MAXIMUM PER RTCS DUE TO CSA SIZE OF 512. 
16, Mission Ops 5) COMMANDS ARE DUMPED IN ORDER OF EXECUTION. 
RTCS Directory 
I RTCS # I # OF CMDSI DESCRIPTION 
1 105 PRI SP WAKE-UP, DEPLOY, SUN ACQ 
2 104 RDNT SP WAKE-UP, DEPLOY, SUN ACQ 
3 5 CSSA CHECK OKAY, ACQ SUN & SET DEPLOY FF 
4 28 CONFIG FOR SAFE HOLD, PRIME SP 
5 28 CON FIG FOR SAFE HOLD, RDNT SP 
6 51 CON FIG FOR SAFE PWR/SUN PT RECOVERY, PRIME SP 
7 51 CON FIG FOR SAFE PWR/SUN PT RECOVERY, RDNT SP 
8 0 SPARE 
9 23 CON FIG FOR SAFE PWR/LONG TERM HOLD, PRIME SP 
10 23 CON FIG FOR SAFE PWR/LONG TERM HOLD, RDNT SP 
11 30 ASCENT MASTER SEQUENCE 
12 3 CSSA CHECK FAILS - DP CPUs OFF 
13 0 CON FIG FOR PREMATURE WAKE-UP 
14 0 CONFIG FOR STANDBY MODE 
15 0 SPARE 
16 0 SPARE 
17 0 SPARE 
18 0 SPARE 
19 2 SELECT SP DUMP FORMAT FOR 12 MINUTES 
20 4 CONFIG FOR XMTR A ON, RANGING OFF, 10 MINUTES 
21 6 CONFIG FOR XMTR A ON, RANGING ON, 10 MINUTES 
22 4 CON FIG FOR XMTR B ON, RANGING OFF,10 MINUTES 
23 6 CONFIG FOR XMTR B ON, RANGING ON, 10 MINUTES 
24 2 CLOCK ADJUST, 12 HR REPEAT 
25 5 BATTERY/OAS TANK HEATER CONTROL 
26 3 NORMAL SCAN, REPEAT EVERY ORBIT 
27 2 SOLAR CAL, REPEAT ONCE PER DAY 
28 2 WAVELENGTH CAL, REPEAT ONCE PER DAY 
29 . 2 ELECTRONICS CAL, REPEAT ONCE PER DAY 
30 2 REFLECTANCE CAL, REPEAT ONCE PER DAY 
31 4 SAFE INSTRUMENT (ALL OFF) 
32 1 SELECT STANDBY MODE (STOW OPTICS) 
TOTAL: 496 
17, Mission Ops 
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I PHASE LOADED I 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
SCIENCEOPS 
PROM FIXED 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
PROM FIXED 
PROM FIXED 
USED DURING 
DEPLOY 
DEPLOY 
DEPLOY 
SAFING 
SAFING 
SAFING 
SAFING 
SAFING 
SAFING 
DEPLOY/ASCENT 
DEPLOY 
BOOST 
A&T 
ROUTINE OPS 
ROUTINE OPS 
ROUTINE OPS 
ROUTINE OPS 
ROUTINE OPS 
ROUTINE OPS 
ROUTINE OPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
SCIENCEOPS 
ALL 
ALL 
• 
• • 
Memory Loads 
Memory loads consist of a memory address location, and the data to.beplaced in 
memory starting at the specified address. 
• The length of the data is limited only by the size of the CIB. 
• 
• Memory loads to multiple locations within one processor may coexist in the 
CIS. 
Memory load Structure 
Command Data Command Special Type Parameter 
5 0 
5 0 
5 8 
Sample 5-Byte SP RAM Data Upload 
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General Memory Dump 
SYNC = E'B90 (HEX) I DUMP 10 I I I I STARTING ADDRESS I I 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
. 
DAT~ 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
NOTES: 
1) DUMP 10 = 03 (HEX) = SP MEMORY DUMP, 08 (HEX) = DP MEMORY DUMP. 
2) DUMP WILL REPEAT FROM SYNC UNTIL DUMP HALTED. 
3) DUMP CAN BE ANY SPECIFIED LENGTH, UP TO 64K BYTES MAXIMUM. 
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• • • 
• • • 
Minor Frame and Header Overview 
1ACFFC1D 
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HEADER 8 BYTES DATA FiElD 
SIGNALING FiElD VCDU TOMS .• ·.·SPACE· . DATA 
VERSION SPACE- VCID VCDU HEADER INSTRUMENT CRAFT FIELD.·.···· 
NO. CRAFT COUNTER REAL-TIME SPARE ERROR SCIENCE· HOUSE· ERROR 
ID VS (ALL CONTROL DATA KEEPING· CONTROL TOTAL: 
RECORDED ZEROES) DATA ... POLY. 144 BYTES 
2 BITS 
01 
(VERSION 2) 
8 BITS 6 BITS 24 BITS 
FRAME FORMAT: 
000=1.125 KB RfT FRAME 001=NORMAL TLM 
001=PLAYBACK FRAME 010=COMPUTER DUMP 
011 =PROGRAMMABLE 
1 BIT 7 BITS 2 BYTES 68 BYTES 62 BYTES 2 BYTES 1152 BITS 
CCSDS RECOMMENDED 
ERROR CONTROL FIELD 
FOR HEADER ONLY 
MAJOR FRAME MINOR FRAME 
COUNTER COUNTER 
0-524287 0-31 
CCSDS RECOMMENDED 
ERROR CONTROL FIELD 
FOR DATA FIELD ONLY 
Instrument/Spacecraft Telemetry Allocations 
SYNC 
4 BYTES 
FRAME 0 
BYTES: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
VERSION 
NO. 
2 BITS 
HEADER 8 BYTES 
SIGNALING FIELD VCDU 
SPACE- VCID VCDU HEADER 
CRAFT COUNTER REAL-TIME SPARE ERROR 
ID VS (ALL CONTROL 
RECORDED ZEROES) 
8 BITS 6 BITS 24 BITS 1 BIT 7 BITS 2 BYTES 
ANALOGTLM STATUS TLM TIME STAMP 
SCIENCE DATA - 68 BYTES 
SCIENCE DATA - 68 BYTES 
SCIENCE DATA - 68 BYTES 
SCIENCE DATA - 68 BYTES 
SCIENCE DATA - 68 BYTES 
SCIENCE DATA - 34 BYTES 
*INST SYNC CODE WILL BE COMPLEMENTED 
(BIT INVERTED) EVERY OTHER SCAN. 
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• 
463 BYTES OF SCIENCE DATA. 
512 BYTES TOTAL DATA / SCAN 
• 
TOMS 
INSTRUMENT 
SCIENCE 
DATA 
68 BYTES 
DATA FiElD 
SPACE- DATA 
CRAFT FIELD 
HOUSE- ERROR 
KEEPING CONTROL TOTAL: 
DATA POLY. 144 BYTES 
62 BYTES 2 BYTES 1152 BITS 
SCIENCE DATA 
• 
• • 
Computer Dump Field Allocation 
I I I 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
I I 
}} ... I m: II I:: I::~} I~)· I::::::: Ii:::::: I?{·IJ·?I 
.:: ... :.:.: < I» I·/i IIii: In: I·:~:;i It:::: 
,.. ..: Irs It..::! • li~::·lj:)::<1 
. r/O .:.~.:.:.:::::\. :: .. ~::; Ii::: 1;[ ::i EXACT Sl RUCTURE 
DEFINED IN KEY 
PARAMETER DATA BASE 
Ir 
• II~wi 
I I 
I I 
C:·:: .• :}.: • ...;~ 
>: .. / :~.:. . ::;:.:.::/ .. : 
•. :: . )\ 
i :} . :,it 
I }. :)( . :~.:; •• 
.... :. 
.. 
Science Data Capture 
• Instrument gathers data every daylight pass as controlled by 
repeating RTCSs . 
• Capability to record 24 hours of science on-board 
• Madrid and Canberra have 56 KBPS NASCOM lines and can route 
50.625 KBPS playback stream to POCC, or can strip and ship real 
. time data from 202.5 KBPS playback and do low rate playbacks 
post-pass 
• Wallops and Goldstone have >224 KBPS NASCOM lines 
• Playback times for 24 hours of data are 8.04 minutes at 202.5 KBPS, 
or 32.7 minutes at 50.625 KBPS 
• Typically, 50 to 90 minutes of ground coverage will be scheduled 
daily. Good margins exist even under worst case configurations 
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• • • 
• • • Routine Pass Timeline 
t---------------- 10RBtT -------------------11 
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01 02 
~o MIN) 
PRE-PASS 
03 
(10 MIN) 
...---ON-PASS 
. (10 MIN' 
r----POST-PASS 
...... _-'. RANGING ON . 
END MfA DUMP 
• END MM DUMP 
• AT CMDS (AS REQ) 
• SIC eLK DETfCOARECTION 
• SEL NORMAL Tl.M FORMAT 
• DUMPIVERIFY CIB 
• UPLK EMPHEM lD (DAIL'tt/KPDIMEM LD (AS REO) 
• XFR CIB 
DUMP/VERIFY CIB 
• UPLK ST CMD lD CDAILlJ 
• SELECT MEtA DUMP FORMAT 
• MM DUMP 44-6 HRS) AT LO RATE 
• UPDATE ELP POINTER 
• INITIATE H " SCHECK 
...... -. CMD TEST (NO-OP) 
---e An~ NMTA nN/l:nlW 
(VARIABLE) 
...----OFF-UNE 
10 
00 
• lCMTA OFFILOS 
• COMP HaS CHECK 
RANGING OFF 
.. ~ 
• = ... TIME I ACTIVITY b COMMANDS I DURAT-,O!'J (h:mm:ss) I It 0:00 SUNRISEfT MS NORMAL SCAN RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 I ... 0:50 AOS CANBERRA :10:00 MASS MEMORY PLAYBACK @ 202.5KBPS :02:00 
ROUTINE STATE OF HEALTH CHECKS 
UPDATE SIC EPHEMERIS :01:00 
TRACKING :07:30 
1:00 LOS CANBERRA 
1:09 ECLIPSEfTOMS TO STANDBY 
1:44 SUNRISEfTOMS NORMAL SCAN 
RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 
2:53 ECLIPSEfTOMS TO STANDBY 
2:58 ELECTRONICS CAL 
RTCS 29,24 HR REPEAT :06:00 
3:06 WAVELENGTH CAL 
RTCS 28, 24 HR REPEAT :06:00 
3:28 SUNRISEfTOMS NORMAL SCAN 
• RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1 :09:00 
Q) 4:37 ECLIPSEfTOMS TO STANDBY 
C 
-- 5:05 
-
AOSWALLOPS :10:00 
Q) MASS MEMORY PLAYBACK@ 202.5KBPS :02:00 
E ROUTINE STATE OF HEALTH CHECKS UPLINK NEXT DAY'S STORED COMMAND LOAD :03:00 
-- TRACKING :07:30 I- 5:12 SUNRISEfTOMS NORMAL SCAN 
~ RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1 :09:00 
:::J 5:15 LOS WALLOPS :10:00 
0 CLOCK ERROR DETERMINATION :05:00 
:c 
~ 6:21 ECLIPSEfTOMS TO STANDBY 
:::J 6:56 SUNRISEfTOMS NORMAL SCAN 0 RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 LL 
I 8:05 ECLIPSEITOMS TO STANDBY ~ 
..... 
C 8:40 SUNRISEfTOMS NORMAL SCAN 
Q) RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1 :09:00 
~ I/) 9:49 ECLIPSEfTOMS TO STANDBY ~. I-
0;;; 
I/) 
:E 
iii 
N 
.~ 
• = .. TIME I ACTIVITY I COMMANDS I DURATION (h:mm:ss) I r: 
9:51 AOSMADRID :10:00 
MASS MEMORY PLAYBACK @ 202.5KBPS :02:00 
ROUTINE STATE OF HEALTH CHECKS 
BACKUP SITE FOR STORED CMD UPLINK :03:00 
TRACKING :07:30 
10:01 LOS MADRID 
10:24 SUNRISEITOMS NORMAL SCAN 
RTCS 26.104 MIN REPEAT 1:02:00 
11 :26 SOLAR IRRADIANCE CAL 
RTCS 22. 24 HR REPEAT :06:00 
11 :33 ECLlPSElTOMS TO STANDBY 
..-.. 12:08 SUNRISEITOMS NORMAL SCAN 
-0 RTCS 26.104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 Q) 
::J 12:28 AOS CANBERRA :10:00 
C MASS MEMORY PLAYBACK@ 202.5KBPS :02:00 
-- ROUTINE STATE OF HEALTH CHECKS +-' 
C BACKUP SITE FOR STORED CMD UPLINK :03:00 
0 TRACKING :07:30 
• 
() 12:38 LOS CANBERRA 
"'-" 13:17 ECLlPSElTOMS TO STANDBY Q) 
C 13:52 SUNRISEITOMS NORMAL SCAN 
-- RTCS 26.104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 
-Q) 
E 15:01 ECLlPSElTOMS TO STANDBY 
--I- 15:36 SUNRISEITOMS NORMAL SCAN 
"-
RTCS 26.104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 
::J 16:45 ECLlPSElTOMS TO STANDBY 0 
I 16:49 AOS WALLOPS :10:00 
"-
COMPLETE MASS MEMORY PLAYBACK@ 202.5KBPS :08:30 
::J ROUTINE STATE OF HEALTH CHECKS 
0 BACKUP SITE FOR STORED CMD UPLINK :03:00 
u.. TRACKING :01:00 
I 16:59 LOS WALLOPS 
~ CLOCK ERROR DETERMINATION :05:00 
+-' 
C 17:20 SUNRI$ElTOMS NORMAL SCAN Q) RTCS 26.104 MIN REPEAT 1 :09:00 ~. Ctl c.. 
• 
0 
I- 18:29 ECLlPSElTOMS TO STANDBY c 0 
·iii 
til 
:i 
ID 
N 
Twenty-Four Hour Timeline (Continued) 
TIME I ACTIVITY I COMMANDS I DURATION (h:mm:ss) I 
19:04 SUNRISEffOMS NORMAL SCAN 
RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 
20:13 ECLIPSEffOMS TO STANDBY 
20:20 REFLECTANCE CAL 
RTCS 25, 24 HR REPEAT :15:00 
.. 20:48 SUNRISEffOMS NORMAL SCAN 
RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 
21 :57 ECLIPSE/TOMS TO STANDBY 
22:32 SUNRISEffOMS NORMAL SCAN 
RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1 :09:00 
22:33 AOS MADRID :10:00 
MASS MEMORY PLAYBACK@ 202.5KBPS :02:00 
UPDATE SIC CLOCK :01:00 
ROUTINE STATE OF HEALTH CHECKS 
LAST OPPORTUNITY FOR STORED CMD UPLINK :03:00 
TRACKING :07:30 
23:41 ECLIPSE/TOMS TO STANDBY 
23:43 LOS MADRID 
0:16 SUNRISEffOMS NORMAL SCAN 
RTCS 26,104 MIN REPEAT 1:09:00 
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• • • 
• • 
Contingency Operations 
• Contingency planning to be provided in "Flight Operations 
Handbook," D 19828 
• Currently planning to provide information as follows: 
28, Mission Ops 
- Recovery from loss of communication/fail to acquire 
- Recovery from Safe Hold Mode 
- Recovery from Safe Power Mode 
- Recovery from UV/OV trip 
- Reconfigurations following subsystem fault isolations (selected 
cases) 
Examples: Configure for Normal Science Mode with alternate gyro 
Configure Normal Backup Mode 1 (scan wheel 2 failed) 
• 
• 
1, Performance Assurance 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Performance Assurance 
• --.!!a ••• 
I~-
• • • Performance Assurance Agenda --~... I~-
System Performance Verification J. Giglio 
EMI/EMC Verification R. Sal 
Spacecraft Test J. Durschinger 
Reliability/FMEA B. Woerner 
System Safety D. McGraw 
Contamination Control K. Henderson 
Materials and Processes M. Hirsch 
EEE Parts G. Penney 
Hardware Quality Assurance L. Irwin 
Software Quality Assurance G. Walsh 
2, Performance Assurance 
--~ .. . I .. . 
Reliability 
• 
3, Performance Assurance 
• • • 
• Reliability Agenda • • --~ .. . I ... . 
• Summary 
• System Predictions 
• FMEA - Critical Items List 
• Limited Life Items List 
• Trend Analysis Parameters 
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TOMS-EP Reliability Summary 
... .!!a ••• 
I~-
• Reliability program implemented in accordance with TOMS-EP 
Reliability Implementation Plan (PA-03) 
• Reliability requirements defined in TOMS-EP System Specifi.cation 
(SY1-0012) 
- 0.90 for 2 years (spacecraft bus reliability) 
- Minimize single point failures 
- Critical item list and controls plans for severity categories 1, 1 R, 
1 S or 2 (mission or safety critical or nonredundant equipment) 
• Reliability predictions and FMEAs updated to CDR design 
- Subcontractor analyses reviewed, approved, and integrated into 
system analyses 
- System analyses coordinated across all program elements 
(safety, EDI, redundancy management, I&T, etc.) 
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• • • 
• • • 
T9MS-EP Reliability Summary (Continued) .--~ ... I~-
• 0.95 predicted reliability exceeds 2-year 0.90 requirement 
- Parts count method implemented. Yields conservative estimate 
• FM EAs identified a very limited number of critical failure modes 
'- Critical item control plans are being developed 
• Limited life items identified 
- Life test plans in place 
• Trend parameters identified 
- Trend parameters are being integrated into integration and test 
planning 
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TOMS-EP System Predictions --.!!a ••• I .... 
2 YEAR 3 YEAR SUBSYSTEM ALLOCATIONS PREDICTIONS PREDICTIONS 
Electrical Power & Distribution 0.975 0.9835 0.9743 Subsystem (EPDS) 
Structure and Mechanisms 0.999 0.9998 0.9998 Subsystem (S&MS) 
Thermal Control Subsystem 0.995 0.99999 0.99997 CTCS) 
Orbital Adjust Subsystem 
0.993 0.9938 0.9908 COAS) 
Attitude Control & 0.970 0.9918 0.9823 Determination Subsystem (ACDS) 
Communications and Data 0.965 0.9831 0.9638 Handling Subsystem CC&DH) 
TOMS Instruments 1.000 1.0000 1.0000 . 
TOMS-EP System 0.900 0.9528 0.9138 
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• • • 
• •• • TOMS-EP System Reliability Block Diagram --.!!a ••• I~-
R = 1 • CD R=CD.9835 R=CD.9998 R=CD.99999 
ELECTRICAL POWER STRUCTURE I 
I DI STRIBUTION MECHANISMS THERMAL CONTROL ~ TOMS INSTRUMENTS l- I-- I-SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM 
(EPDS) (SIMS) nCS) 
R=CD.9938 R=CD.9818 R=CD.9831 
ATTITUDE CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS 
ORBIT ADJUST 
I DETERMINATION I DATA HANDLI NG 
SUBSYSTEM 
SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM (OAS) (ACDS) (CIDHS) 
R (2 YR) = 0. 9527 
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TOMS-EP Critical Items List --~ ... 1..--
ITEM FAILURE MODE SEVERITY JUSTIFIOATION FOR RETENTION LEVEl. 
PROPELLANT TANK/DIAPHRAGM EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, TANK 1,2 - STRESS/FRACTURE ANALYSES VERIFY DESIGN MARGINS 
RUPTURE OR DIAPHRAGM - QUAL SINE VIBRATION, PROOF PRESSURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, 
FAILURE AND DIAPHRAGM PHYSICAL PROPERTIES TESTS 
- RADIOGRAPHIC AND PENETRANT WELD INSPECTIONS 
PRIMARY (SOLAR ARRAY HINGE BINDS DURING 2 - TITANIUM WASHERS BETWEEN HINGE HALVES PROVIDE 
WING) HINGE SOLAR ARRAY DEPLOYMENT REDUNDANT ROTATING SURFACES 
- ROTATING SURFACES BURNISHED WITH MOLYBDENUM-DISULFIDE 
TO REDUCE FRICTION 
- TORQUE VERSUS ANGLE TEST TO VERIFY SPECIFIED TORQUE 
MARGIN OVER ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT RANGE 
NITINOL DEVICE ENVIRONMENTALLY HEATED 2 - DEVELOPMENT AND QUAUFICATION TESTS VERIFY MARGIN 
(AUTO ACTIVIATION) BETWEEN DEPLOYMENT AND AUTO ACTIVATION TEMPERATURES 
- LOT SAMPLE TESTS VERIFY TEMPERATURE CHARACTERISTICS 
- ALL DEVELOPMENT, QUALIRCA TION AND FUOHT DEVICES 
WILL BE FROM THE SAME LOT 
NITINOL FRANGIBOL T INCORRECT GAP 2 - BOLT PRELOADEO TO 83" OF RATED TENSILE STRENGTH 
- LOCKING NUT WILL BE USED TO PREVENT LOOSING OF BOLT 
- LOT SAMPLE TESTS WILL VERIFY BOLT BREAK CHARACTERISTICS 
- ALL DEVELOPMENT. QUALIFICATION AND FUGHT DEVICES 
WILL BE FROM THE SAME LOT 
NITINOL WASHER INCORRECT SIZE 2 - LOT SAMPLE TESTS WILL VERIFY WASHER SIZING AND MATERIAL 
- ALL DEVELOPMENT. QUALIRCATION AND FUOHT WASHERS 
WILL BE FROM THE SAME LOT 
SOLAR ARRAY REGULATOR INPUT WIRING OPEN 2 - ADDITIONAL INSULATION INSTALLED ON BASE OF SAR CHASSIS 
OR SHORT TO GROUND, TO PROVIDE A SECOND INSULATION BARRIER FOR CRITICAL WIRES 
OR OPEN RELAY WIPER - SPECIAL CONTROLS FOR STORAGE AND HANDLING OF RELAYS 
- ADDITIONAL QA INSPECTION CALLOUTS FOR WIRE ROUTING, 
SHARP EDOES. SOLDER WICKING AND FOR RECORDING THE NUMBER 
OF RELAY CYCLES 
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• • • 
• • • TOMS-EP Critical Items List (Continued) --~ ... I~-
ITEN FAILURE MODE SEVERITY JUSTIFICATION FDA RETENTION LEVEL 
POWER CONTROL UNIT MAIN POWER BUS SHORT-TO- 2 - INSULATORS INSTALLED BETWEEN BUS BARS AND PCU CHASSIS 
GROUND - ADDITIONAL INSULATION INSTALLED ON PCU CHASSIS TO PROVIDE A 
SECOND INSULAnON BARRIER FOR CRITICAL WIRES 
- ADDITIONAL QA INSPECTION CALLOUTS FOR WIRE ROUTlNG, SHARP 
EDGES AND SOLDER WlCKING 
OPEN WIPER OF THE DC/DC 2 - SPECIAL CONTROLS FOR STORAGE AND HANDLING OF RELAYS 
CONVERTER OUTPUT POWER - ADDITIONAL QA INSPECTION CALLOUTS FOR WIRE ROUTING, SHARP 
SELECT RELAY, OR A WIRING EDGES, W1CKING AND FOR RECORDING THE NUMBER OF RELAY CYCLES 
SHORT-TO-GROUND ON DC BUS - ADDITIONAL INSTALLAnON INSTALLED ON PCU CHASSIS TO PROVIDE 
A SECOND INSULAnON BARRIER FOR CRITICAL WIRES 
OPEN WIPER OF PRIMARY/ 2 - SPECIAL CONTROLS FOR STORAGE AND HANDLING OF RELAYS 
REDUNDANT SPACECRAFT - ADDITIONAL QA INSPEcnON CALLOUTS AND FOR RECORDING THE 
PROCESSOR SELECT RELAYS NUMBER OF RELAY CYCLES 
C+SV RELAY OR +1-15V 
RELAY) 
SPACECRAFT HARNESS BATTERY TO PCU HARNESS ·2 - CRITICAL WIRE BUNDLES WILL BE BETA WRAPPED 
ASSEMBLIES SHORT-TO-GROUND - I,OOOV HIGH VOLTAGE INSULATION TEST TO VERIFY THAT THE 
INSULAnON RESISTANCE EXCEEDS 100 MEG OHMS 
- INSPEcnON FOR DAMAGE OF INSTALLED HARNESS ASSEMBLY 
SOLAR ARRAY WING HARNESS 2 - CRITICAL WIRE BUNDLES WILL BE BETA WRAPPED 
TO SOLAR ARRAY REGULATOR - I,ODDV HIGH VOLTAGE INSULATION TEST TO VERIFY THAT THE 
SHORT-TO-GROUND INSULA nON RESISTANCE EXCEEDS 100 MEG. OHMS 
- INSPEcnON FOR DAMAGE OF INSTALLED HARNESS ASSEMBUES 
BATTERY ASSEMBLY BATTERY CELL SHORT - TO- 2 - DUAL CERAMlC-TO-METAL SEALS ISOLATING BOTH CELL TERMINALS 
GROUND - EACH CELL IS WRAPPED WITH MYLAR INSULATION MATERIAL 
NADIR CS-BAND) MECHANICAL DAMAGE DUE 2 - DETAILED MECHANICAL INSTALLATION PROCEDURES TO PREVENT 
ANTENNA TO HANDUNG ANDIOR HANDUNGIINSTALLATION DAMAGE 
DURING INSTALLA nON - INSPECTION FOR DAMAGE PRIOR TO AND AFTER INSTALLATION 
- ANTENNA RF TESTS PERFORMED PRIOR TO LAUNCH AT WALLOPS 
FLIGHT FACILITY 
NADIR RF CABLE OPEN OR SHORT-TO-GROUND 2 - ALL RF CABLE CONNECTORS ARE X-RAYED AFTER CABLE 
ASSEMBLY OF EITHER THE ANTENNA INSTALLAnON AND MA nNG 
CONNECTOR OR THE - INSPECTION FOR DAMAGE AFTER INSTALLATION AND REVIEW 
RF ASSEMBLY CONNECTOR OF X-RAY RESULTS 
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TOMS-EP Limited Life Item List 
--.!!a ••• 
I ... 
SUBSYSTEM ITEM SENSITIVE NPACT ON EXPECTED LFE REQUIRED LFE DUTY CYCLE COMMENTS PARAMETERS MISSION PARAMETERS (RATINO) (APPLICATION) 
ACDS Soanwheels Bearing, Swltoh to redundant a years 2 years 100~ Life tests will be 
Lubrloant reaotlon wheel performed. 
Lubricant losa 
analyala. 
ACDS Reaotlon Bearing, Seoond failure a years 2 years 100~ Life tests will be 
Wheel Lubrloant performed. 
Lubricant lo.a 
analyala. 
ACDS Gyro Bearing, Switch to redundant 5 year. 2 year. 100~ Life test will be 
Lubrloant system performed. 
EPDS Battery Temperature, Loss of mission 17000 oyoles 10100 oyoles 100~ Life tests will be 
Overoharge bus performed. 
voltage Five oells to be 
tested. 
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• • • 
• • • TOMS-EP Trend Analysis Parameters --~ ... I~-
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT TEST PARAMETER 
C&DHS TRANSPONDER - RECEIVER INPUT SENSITIVITY 
- RECEIVER COMMAND THRESHOLD 
- TRANSMITTER MODULATION INDEX 
- TRANSMITTER DOWNLINK FREQUENCY STABILITY 
- TRANSMITTER OUTPUT POWER LEVEL 
ACDS GYRO - MOTOR CURRENT 
- RUN-UP-TIME 
RWA AND - MOTOR VOL TAQE 
SCAN WHEELS - RUN-UP-TIME AND RUN-DOWN-TIME 
12, Performance Assurance 
.--~ ... 
I~-
System Safety 
13, Performance Assurance 
• • • 
• • • System Safety Requirements ~.!!a ••• I~-
• Contractual policy documents 
- GMI 1771.1, "Range Safety Policies and criteria for GSFCIWaliops 
Flight Facility" 
- MIL-STD-1574A, "System Safety Program for Space and Missile 
Systems" . 
• Contractual technical requirements documents 
~ WSMCR 127-1, "Western Space and Missile Center Range Safety 
Requirements" 
-. MIL-STD-1522A, "Safety Requirements for Pressurized System" 
- Contract NAS5-31488, Modification Number 18, "Propellant Lines shall 
be one fault tolerance against overheating to temperatures greater 
than 160°F" . 
• Pending safety requirements 
- Wallops safety document currently in work. Will address WFF ground 
safety and Orbital Sciences Corporation (SC) flight safety 
requirement~ 
- OSC Pegasus requirements issued to industry are man-rated safety 
requirements for carrier aircraft 
14. Performance Assurance 
Safety Program --~ ... I~-
• Systems design safety approach implemented for TOMS-EP 
- Implemented contractual safety requirements (ground safety) 
- Where practical, implemented flight safety design features anticipating 
man-rated requirements, e.g. two fault electrical and mechanical 
tolerance for OAS to catastrophic hazards 
• ~afety analysis ~ctivity 
- Preliminary Accident Risk Assessment report (ARAR) prepared and 
submitted at POR 
- Hazard analysis completed to WSMCR and MIL-STO-1522A 
requirements 
- Updated ARAR not planned until flight safety requirements are defined 
for TOMS-EP 
• Preliminary assessment of OSC safety document SSO-TO-005 conducted 
. for OAS System 
- Assessment results reviewed by NASA WFF at interface working group 
meeting held at WWF 
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• • • 
• • • TOMS-EP Design Safety Features --~ ... I~-
• Propulsion System (OAS) 
- 2 fault tolerant mechanically and electrically to catastrophic hazards 
- 3 seals on fill and drain module 
- All-welded design 
- Hydrazine fully pressurized to thrusters to eliminate adiabatic detonation 
and pressure transients 
- Propellant tank safety factor of 1.5: 1 
- Tank burst factor of 2 to 1 
Complies with MIL-STD-1522A 
- 2 of 3 electrical inhibits are monitorable 
- Tank temperature and pressure are telemetered for ground monitoring. 
Other safety parameters are available for telemetry 
• Structu res 
- Meets 1.5 S.F. during captive carry 
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TOMS-EP Design Safety Features (Continued) 
• Materials 
- Use of flammable materials minimized 
• Solar Array 
- 2 fault tolerant against premature deployment/operation 
• Batteries 
- Over-charge protection 
- Battery telemetry data available 
• Premature computer (spacecraft processor) operation 
- Computer locked-out by breakwire inhibits and cannot issue 
commands until after separation 
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• • 
--~ ... 
I~-
• 
• • • Wallops Ground Safety --~ ... I~-
• Propellant Loading 
- Hydrazine loading tasks are being defined with Wallops 
- Propellant loading will consist of Wallops and TRW personnel 
• 'MGSE 
- Industry-standard safety factors 
- 5 to 1 on lifting equipment 
- Annual proof and nondestructive inspection (NDI) tests 
18, Performance Assurance 
Safety Certification Process 
--.!!a ••• 
I~-
• Open issues 
- Ground rules need to be established for TOMS-EP safety approval 
process for Pegasus man-rated program 
- To date, no formal safety certification meetings held with Wallops and 
OSC 
- Wallops safety document not released . 
19, Performance Assurance 
• • • 
• 
20, Performance Assurance 
• 
TOMS-EP 
Contamination Control 
(lJl, 
• Iii. 
1< \k~ t11SorJ 
TOMS-EP Contamination Control Plan 
Scope 
• The plan for contamination control is end-to-end: from design 
and component fabrication through launch 
• The plan includes protective measures for the instrument 
from the time it is received by TRW until the entire spacecraft 
is launched 
• Contamination Working Group Meetings are being held at 
regular intervals, including GSFC, TRW, P-E and OSC, to 
discuss interface issues 
21, Performance Assurance 
• • 
--~ ... I~-
• 
• • • TOMS-EP Program --~ ... I~-
Contamination Control Requirements 
• Provide Contamination Control Plan 
- Polymeric materials meeting 0.1 % VCM, 1.0% TML (PAR) 
Bake-out of thermal blankets, solar arrays, and wire harnesses (PAR) 
- 1& T in Class 10,000 clean area (System Specification, SY1-0012) 
- Minimize instrument contamination through spacecraft design, Class 
100 flow bench (System Specification, SY1-0012) . 
- Visibly clean components (derived) 
- Prelaunch cleanliness goal of 750A (derived) 
• Provide Source and Effects Analysis 
- Results used to validate design for venting directions/locations and 
protective covers 
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Contamination Control Plan 
... ~ ... 
I~-
• Requirements 
- Design/Material Requirements 
- Cleanliness Requirements 
- Vendor-Supplied Hardware 
- Facility/Operational Requirements 
- Launch/Mission Requirements 
• ,I mplementation 
- Materials and Processes (including thermal vacuum bake-outs) 
- Fabrication, Assembly, Test, Shipment, including critical operations 
- Monitoring 
, - Covering/Purging 
- Cleaning/Inspection 
Clean Area Practices 
- Launch Site Operations 
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• • • 
• • • 
TRW Cleanliness Goals (MIL-STD-12468) 
--~ ... I~-
• Spacecraft Bus (derived) 
- End of assembly/close-out all surfaces: 500A goal 
- End of 1& T all surfaces: 600A goal 
- Prelaunch all surfaces: 750A goal 
- Using inspection method that verifies surfaces below 750A 
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Facility/Operational Requirements --~ ... I~-
• Facility Air Cleanliness per FEO-STO-2090 
Air Cleanliness Requirement per FED-STD-209D 
Hardware Types 
Instrument Covered Instrument Uncovered 
Structural Details Partsl Assembly Normal shop environment* 
ElectroAic Manufacturing and Solar Arrays lRW document HQAM 5.5 
Propulsion Subsystem Class 10,000 
Thermal Control Insulation Class 300,000 
Spacecraft Bus Assembly and Test Class 10,000 
Thermal Vacuum Facility ORW) Per Contamination Control Plan, Per Contamination Control Plan, 
D19082 D19082 
Ins~ment Integration to Spacecraft Class 10,000 
Instrument Contingency Operation Area (lRW) Class 100 (Portable Clean Area) 
"Satellite" Test and Integration (lRW) Class 10,000 
Launch Site Operation Class 10,000 Class 100 
*Parts and assemblies cleaned and/or inspected to visibly clean before transport into the Class 10,000 I&T area. . 
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• • • 
• • Contamination Control Implementation 
I&T Flow 
• EJechtcliatsy Ifell 
.... HOAM 55 lwei • 
• ~e bake cab1e8 
wIh TOCM24 .... 
.E-ST a. 17S·F 
-vitIlfydeln 
~ __ """bog: 
deln _ neceaNIY 
before removal 
• 0..10,000 
• Pre-cte .. MGSE 
• Solve .. wip&'locuum 
llrucltKe pdor to dMe 
... 
• Predean chamber 
• PrebakechambeJ .... 
.tn •• Jllal .. , TOCM 
and ReM. ,,,...led 
• Verly delr1ln •• wth ...,.. 
• VIouoIl ........... 
-0..10.000 
• ... 8Ianwtn ..... n 
· _g~ .. r"""_bogwlt1 ~ 
•• necess.-y 
• Keepcharmer 
wll' colder Ihln 
_1ft 
• Insl •• toft cover over spcect'.rt 
• Inspec:tkleln lIpateaaft bus .. 
necessary In de ... re. 
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• GII_ 10,000 
-0 •• 10,000 
• aNn .. -..., conIaln. 
• V8fIy pufQl de .. In._ 
·NVR ...... d ... lppngc ... _ 
• T.,...,." .... 6"humklty oontr~ 
• HepI I •• In IhlA*lg conr .... 8' 'Of venl 
• --~.. . I ... . 
Sp., .... bopd_v dt..- ....... I« ... , 
VorIyT.(;_ 
de_nlnetI 
.NVR .... 
• wIn .. ~III" 
~_SCIor 
conIannallon.ner ... ; 
dean a. nec;ess.-y 
Contamination Control Implementation 
Launch Site Flow 
Dry gas purge during 
transport from aircraft 
to LVAB 
R.mov.and 
r.plac. wltn ••• 
plat •• 
SHIP 
SPACECRAFT 
RECEIVE AND 
INSPECT 
SPACECRAFT 
LAUNCH BASE 
FUNCTIONAL 
TEST 
RECONDITION DSN 
o Clean & inspect shipping 
container hardcover in class 
100,000 staging area 
o Move spacecraft into Class 
10,000 clean area 
and remove container caver 
o Inspect bagging; remove 
o Inspect visual cleanliness of 
Spacecraft 
o NVR sampling 
o Class 10,000 
o Instrument bagged and 
purged as needed 
BATTERY J--___ ~ COMPATIBILITY 
(2 CYCLES) AND POCC 
o Class 10,000 
o Instrument bagged 
and purged as needed 
~ND-TO-END TEST 
o Class 10,000 
o Instrument bagged 
and purged as needed 
R.mov.and 
r.plac. wltn ••• t---I-"~ 
plat •• 
• mov.a~d r~plac. wRne •• 
plat •• 
o Monitor area as meeting Class 
10,000 before removing SIC bag Remove shipping container lid, 
spacecraft remains bagged 
REMOVE SIC MATE SIC TO PROPELLANT 
BAGGING & 1 
r----IPERFORM CLEANLI- .... 1-'---1 PEGASUS & PERF ..... i---.,.....---! LOADING & 
NESS INSPECTION INTFC CHECKS PRESSURIZATION 
o Monitor area as meeting 
Class 10,000 before 
removing bag 
o Class 10,000 
o Clean mated surfaces 
o Bagging compatible 
with hydrazine 
o Instrument purged 
, 
o Inspect/spot clean as 
necessary 
o Scan mirror and diffuser 
cover on until last moment 
L-__ 0 Inspect/clean spacecraft bag 
o Move into Class 10,000 area, 
remove spacecraft bag 
o Use portable Class 100 
clean room as needed 
during operation o Pre-clean fairing to 850A (visibly clean) 
t-------------~.. 0 Check launch vehicle purge 
cleanlinessltemperatureJRH 
. 
.. 
INSTALL 
FAIRING 
o Class 10,000 
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• 
.. 
o Remove witness plates 
ACTIVATE DRY TRANSPORT TO 
GAS PURGE ON I----~: CARRIER 
FAIRING AIRCRAFT 
o Maintain dry gas filtered 
purge on fairing during 
transportation and flight 
line operation. 
MOVE TO 
BOOSTER 
FACILITY 
o Instrument bagged 
and purged 
MATE 
PEGASUS 
TO AIRCRAFT 
AND TAKE OFF 
-
o Maintain dry gas filtered 
purge on fairing before 
take-off and during 
captive carry 
FINAL 
CLOSE-OUT 
AND 
INSPECTION 
o Class 10,000 
o General SIC cleaning as 
necessary to meet 
inspection requirements 
• Bag spacecraft, expose 
propellant loading hook-up 
points, install shipping 
container lid 
• 
• • 
Contamination Sources and Effects 
Approach 
I Identify collec~or surfaces II Determine outgassing ratesl 
Identify critical 
contamination 
sources 
(non':meta lie 
materials) VCM 
Establish 
temperature 
deltas from 
source to 
collector 
Particulate 
analysis ~ 
* * 
Contamination 
analysis 
program 
(CAP) 
or 
MOLEFLUX 
1 
Depositions on 
critical surfaces 
and rates 
~ 
r.-
TRASYS 
Establish view 
factors from 
source to 
collector 
I Monte Carlo 
~ 
Plume 
flowfield 
analysis 
I Determine effects of contamination levels I 
~ 
• Refine analysis 
Compare .. ~~ No .. • Increase 
predicted ,.. ~f.>T r contamination 
and ,,,,Yes controls 
allowable 
No further action I II Materials or design degradation changes 
28, Performance Assurance 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Identify contamination sources 
Identify sensitive potential 
"collector" surfaces 
Perform Molecular Diffusion 
Analysis 
Perform Particulate Distribution 
Analysis (launch, on-orbit) 
Perform Plume Flowfield Analysis 
• Conservative Assumptions. 
Materials were not 
pre-conditioned for analysis 
(Le., no bake-outs, no thermal 
vacuum test exposure) 
Analysis results were not 
reduced to consider that some 
materials are overcoated with 
others 
Contamination Sources - Molecular 
• Ground operations - 100 Angstroms NVR (non-volatile residue) 
• On orbit - Outgassing sources (Penzane lubricant not included here because the 
amount is insignificant compared to other sources) 
• Thruster exhaust gases 
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• 
INTERNAL VENT 
CONTAMINATION 
7~1~)CONNEClORS 
• (2.0%) P0111NG 
1(10.0%) ELEC BONDING 
10 (7.~) PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD 
11 (3.~) CHEMGLAZE (Z306) 
12 (O.~) GROMMETS 
13 (1~) CONFORMAL COAT 
• 
• ~2.ft) HAANESSESIWIRES 
1 (O.~) TANK INSULAllON 
4 (3.0%) HEATERS 
3 (2.0%) EDGE COAEFlLL 
2 (S.O%) INSERTS 
1 (O.~) HONEYCOMIBONDING 
1. (14.',.) SOLAR ARRAYS 
11 (7.) OUTER CORE PAlNTSIllU 
14 (3.~) OUTER OAS PAlNTSIllU 
EXTERNAL 
CONTAMINATION 
• 
• • Molecular Diffusion Analysis 
'Computer Model and Inputs 
• Contamination Analysis Program (CAP) 
- Developed by J. M. Millard of JPL for GSFC 
• --~ ... ,,,. 
- Analysis of mass transport in the free molecular flow environment 
• Temperatures Sources and Collectors 
- Outgassing temperature for most sources 70°F 
- Solar arrays: model run twice, at 120°F (as a source) and OaF (as 
a collector) 
• Included in the model: with solar arrays at 120°F, contamination outgassing 
from the spacecraft could "bounce" off the arrays onto the instrument or 
spacecraft body panels 
- OAS panels: modeled at 70°F as a source, 50°F as a collector 
- Core panels: modeled at 70°F as a source, OaF as a collector 
- Scan wheel: OaF (mirror), 20°F (lens) as collectors 
-' Instrument radiator: modeled at 20°F as a collector 
- Instrument diffuser: modeled at 20°F as a collector 
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Molecular Diffusion Analysis (Continued) --~ ... I~-
• Volatile Condensible Material Source - Electronics 
Location Material Weight % Vl.:M 
(g) VCM (g) 
Interior ~UI'faces of Platforms 
Electronic boxes Conformal coat, Soli thane 113/300 
(Nadir/central) 2949.70 0.04(1) 1.18 
(OAS) 194.86 0.04(1) 0.27 
Wire insulation (fefzel or Kapton) 842.77 (Nadir/central) 0.03(1) 0.25 
(OAS) 97.43 0.03(1) 0.06 
.. 
Magnetics, potting Hysol C15-015 
(ES0092) (Nadir/central) 421.38 0.04(2) 0.17 
(OAS) 97.43 0.04(2) 0.04 
Bonding - EC2216 (Nadir/central) 1685.54 0.05(1,2) 0.84 
(OAS) 389.72 0.05(1,2) 0.19 
Printed circuit board (Nadir/central) 6236.50 0.01(1,2) 0.62 
(OAS) 1441.98 0.01(1,2) 0.14 
Connectors (Nadir/central) 589.94 0.10 0.58 
(OAS) 136.40 0.10 0.14 
Exterior Paint - Chemglaze 
Z306 (Nadir/central) 193.00 0.10(1) 0.19 
(OAS) 58.81 0.10(1) 0.06 
Electronics box grommets Silicone gasket (Nadir/central) 99.9 0.07(1) 0.07 
(OAS) 19.49 0.01 
Scan wheel, reaction wheel Penzane X-2000 plus 5% lead 2 (est) 0.21(4) M!M (gyros hermetically sealed) napthenate 
Total without bake-out (OAS) 1.83 
(Nadir/Center) 5.75 
Total with electronics and harness 
bake-out (OAS) 1.15 
(Nadir/Center) 3.21 
Notes: (1) NASA JSC 08962; (2) TRW tested per ASTM 595; (3) NASA 1124; and (4) GSFC tested. 
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• • 
Generic Electronic Boxes 
Material % by weight 
of box 
Aluminum 40 
Printed Circuit Board 14.8 
Components 23 
Conformal Coating 7 
Adhesive 4 
Wiring 2 
Connectors 2.8 
Potting Material 1 
Misc. Metallic Materials 5 
Exterior Paint 0.4 
Harnesses 
Material % by weight 
of harness 
Wire ;~ Insulation 
Connector Potting 8 
Connector and Pins 12 
• VCM data for electronics based on 
"generic box" configuration 
• Box weight percentages aSSigned 
for each type of material generally 
found in an electronics box 
• Assumption has been validated by 
latest available data from subcon-
tractors supplying electrpnics 
• All surfaces modeled as having 
100A initial surface contamination 
• 
• • • --~ .. . I ... . Molecular Diffusion Analysis (Continued) 
• View factors - calculated by thermal engineer using TRASYS II 
• Outgassing rate constants ~ a multiplier CAP uses for remaining source outgassing VCM 
Used outgassing data from two different sources: 
"Characterization of Contamination Generation Characteristics of Satellite Materials", 
by P. Glassford 
Used data from a paper on the"Wide Field Planetary Camera", by J. Barnegoltz and 
D. Taylor 
Used outgassing data for the same materials or materials similar (Le. same base 
polymer) to those used on spacecraft 
1000 
• • • • 
900 
800 
• 700 
600 
Deposit (A) 
500 
400 
300 • 
200 
100 
1 Week 2 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Time 
32, Performance Assurance Instrument Radiator Molecular Build.Up (No. 11) 
Molecular Diffusion Analysis (Continued) 
• Vent Paths 
(;! ~) ... -J'c. ...... :>. 
x - ,.,..~ • .,s ~., .. t. ~ .. ,.>. 
)0 ('i3] 
Central platform electronics vented out 5 openings: 
5% out nadir electrical feed-through (node 60) 
l"")/) ... S"/, ~ ..... 
'foJ! .. ,.,..''rJ c •• ,.1> 
OU,I3 
23.75% out each of the scan wheel holes (nodes 32,45) 
23.75% out each of the central platform electrical feed-throughs (nodes 29,42) 
OAS platform vented out 5 openings 
150/0 out each of the OAS electrical feed-throughs (nodes 28,41 and 29,42) 
40% out the 10-inch hole in the bottom of the OAS module 
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• • 
--~ .. . I .. . 
• 
• • Molecular Diffusion Analysis (Continued) • --.!!a ••• I .... 
Summary of Results ~j 'If ~~~r() ~u , 'I I f \ I 
Surface Depo,nion Effect Allowable Change Due to Contamination 
/ 
Instrument Radiator (1 of 3) ~76A Aas 0.10 'IBD 
Instrument MLI 331A Aas 0.033 'IBD 
Spacecraft Earth Sensor 
2701A Mirror Decrease in trans- <20% (TBR) 
. Lens 6146A mission by 10% 
Spacecraft Solar Arrays 
1112A Molecular outgassing 1 % transmission Included in performance 
Plume contamination 100A and power loss uncertainty design factor 
+X+Y OAS body panels I09A Aas 0.01 Aas 0.04 (aluminum tape) 
Aas 0.05 (ZOT) 
-Y,+ Y OAS body panels 360A Aas 0.036 Aas 0.06 (leafing aluminum paint) 
-X-Y OAS body panels 119A Aas 0.012 Aas 0.04 (aluminum tape) 
Aas 0.05 (ZOT) 
-Y, + Y core body panels 339A Aas 0.034 Aas 0.04 (aluminum tape) 
Aas 0.05 (ZOT) 
-X-Y and +X+Y core body panels 128A Aas 0.013 Aas 0.05 (ZOT) 
Scan Wheel MLI 262A Aas 0.026 N/A 
Note: For surfaces with less than 100A deposition, numbers were not reported ,_ .AI ~ ~ 
L\ 0.01 a s for every 100A q{ b A i { /vot W/l/)aJ- ~ ffLlV .jt; 
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Particulate Distribution --~ .. . I ... . 
and Plume Flowfield Analysis 
Particulate Distribution 
• Performed to analyze transfer of particulates to instrument 
• Initial surface cleanliness levels of 850, 750, and 500 for the fairing, 
spacecraft, and instrument respectively 
• Results indicate that nadir platform surface of the spacecraft is level 900, 
the vertical surfaces of the spacecraft are level 750, and the instrument is 
level 550 following the venting process 
• This analysis does not include particulate contamination caused during 
fairing release 
• Atomic oxygen effect is insignificant at the TOMS-EP orbital altitude 
Plume Flowfield Analysis 
• Direct simulation Monte Carlo model used to compute plume flowfield 
during delta-V maneuvers 
• Results indicate: 
- 10 Angstroms of aniline nitrate deposits onto the instrument and the front 
face (nadir) of spacecraft due to ambient scattering of plume molecules 
- Peak deposition of 2000A, average of less than 100A on one side and 
50A on the other due to direct impingement of plume on solar arrays 
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• • • • 
• • Source and Effects Analysis Conclusions/ 
Recommendations 
• Iiiii' 
• Spacecraft self-contamination will not be significant enough to have 
detrimental effects on spacecraft performance 
/Oo .. A'~ () I~ ~~ 
• Largest depositions identified over three years: 
- Instrument radiator = 976A (because instrument is near nadir vent) 
-- If the thermal vacuum test is considered in the analysis this is 
reduced to 650A 
- Spacecraft scan wheel (earth sensor) = 8950A (because assembly 
is at large vent for central platform electronics) 
• Venting from interior spacecraft electronics is largest source of 
contamination 
• Recommendations 
- Hermetically sealed "plug" in 3-inch hole venting toward instrument or 
use MLI to redirect any outgassing that leaks past "plug" (reducing 
the contamination on the instrument radiator to almost nothing) 
- .. MLI should be used to selectively vent outgassing through scan 
wheel hole away from scan wheel optics 
Bake-out all electronics 
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TOMS-EP Contamination Control 
Open Issues 
1) Pegasus fairing release 
contamination (particulates) 
2) Pegasus fairing outgassing 
contamination created during 
aerodynamic warming 
3) Contamination contributed by 
frangibolt 
4) Pegasus fairing cleanliness 
and nitrogen purge and 
captive carry purge 
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• 
Approach to Resolution 
Fairing separation test conducted in 
June failed. Meet with GSFC for any 
useful contamination data. Fairing being 
re-designed to solve contamination and 
separation problems. 
Collect material and temperature data 
for fairing during ascent for quick 
analysis - pending resolution of item 1. 
Conduct testing in vacuum at simulated 
temperatures and configuration. 
Prebake silicone material or replace 
with low outgassing alternative. 
Work with GSFC and OSC at Con-
tamination Working Group meetings 
for resolution. 
• • 
• • • 
Materials and Processes 
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• • • 
Materials and Processes -Overview --~ ... I~-
• TOMS-EP M&P issues are being worked during weekly PMPCBs and 
GSFCfTRW telecons 
• TOMS-EP Materials and Processes (M&P) program being implemented in 
accordance with PAIP 
- Inorganic materials compliant with MSFC-SPEC-522B, Table I 
- Organic materials compliant with SP-R-0022A vacuum outgassing 
requirement. Total mass loss (TML) < 1.0% and maximum collected 
volatile condensible material (CVCM) < 0.10/0. Noncompliant materials 
addressed by Material Usage Agreements (MUAs) and considered in 
Contamination Analysis 
• All TOMS-EP Materials and Processes, TRW and subcontractors, are 
documented in Project Approved Materials and Processes List (PAMPL) 
- Updated PAMPL (Revision A) is released 
• A total of 48 MUAs have been prepared and submitted for GSFC approval 
- Majority submitted because material does not meet outgassing 
requirement 
- MUAs not submitted for flammability per GSFC Flight Assurance 
Manager direction 
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Materials and Processes Overview (Continued) 
• Subcontractors are being reviewed for M&P compliance 
- Acceptability of design via drawings and documentation review 
- Materials compliance to TRW subcontractor PARs 
- Fabrication processes to NHB 5300.4 guidelines. Soldering to 
MIL-STD-2000AlNHB 5300.4(3A-1 )/PR3-46 
- Processes certifications 
- SDRL approval,. e.g. manufacturing (fabrication and inspection) plan, 
Materials and Processes List (MUAs) 
- Onsite audits of processes and flight hardware 
- Printed wire board (PWB) coupons inspection to MIL-P-5511 0 (GSFC) 
• Copies of TRW·s and subcontractors· processes documents have been 
forwarded to GSFC per request 
- Fabrication process procedures/specifications 
- Soldering training manuals 
- Soldering certifications 
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• • • 
• • • 
Materials and Processes Overview (Continued) 
• Subtier vendors reviewed and certified to TRW processes as appropriate, 
e.g. Ricmar Engineering to be certified by TRW for insert and bushing 
installation qualification of panels and platforms 
• TRW drawings reviewed to date for compliance to PAMPL 
- 72 structure drawings, 62 reviewed, 40 approved 
- 39 propulsion drawings, 30 reviewed, 24 approved 
- 12 sun sensor drawings reviewed 
- 5 valve drive electronics drawings reviewed 
• Wheel Bearing Lubricant: Pennzane SH F-2000 (formerly X2000) plus 5% 
Lead Napthenate 
- Very low vapor pressure at room temperature (4 x 10 -12 Torr) 
- Outgassing tested by NASAlGSFC: TML = 2.510/0, VCM = 0.210/0 
. - Outgassing included in Contamination Sources and Effects Analysis 
- MUA submitted 
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Materials and Processes 
Requirements Versus Capabilities 
Source: 019086, TOMS-EP PAIP 
--~ ... 
11'8 
Paragraph/Requirement Capability Verification 
6.2.1, Compliant Materials Conventional Meet SP-R-0022A criteria, listed in TOMS-EP Analysis, 
Application, meet selection criteria PAMPL 019079. All noncompliant materials Drawing Review 
will be addressed by MUA 
6.2.5.1, Flammability and Toxic Offgass- Materials properties identified in TOMS-EP Analysis, Test 
ing NHB 8060.1. PAMPL 019079 
WSMCR 127-1, paragraph 3.10.2 
6.2.5.2, Vacuum Outgassing Selected materials listed in TOMS-EP PAMPL Analysis, Test 
SP-R-0022A TML ~ 1.00/0, VCM ~ 0.1 % D19079. Noncompliant materials will be 
addressed by MUA 
6.2.5.3, Shelf Life Control of Material 
6.2.6, Inorganic Materials 
MSFC-SPEC-522B, Table 1 
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• 
TRW shelf life control document 001443 
Metals selected per 522B, Table 1 
• 
Inspection, Test 
Drawing Review 
• 
• • • 
Materials and Processes 
Requirements Versus Capabilities 
Source: 019086, TOMS-EP PAIP 
Paragraph/Requirement 
6.2.6.1, Fasteners GSFC S-313-100 
6.3, Processes Selection. Qualified 
Processes, Material Integrity 
6.3.1, Welding and Brazing Approved 
Procedures, Qualified Operators 
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Capability Verification 
TRW standard quality assurance requirements Inspection, Test 
for procured items, 004740 
Processes selected from TOMS-EP PAMPL, Analysis, 
019079 Orawing Review, 
Specifications 
Review 
Processes selected from TOMS-EP PAMPL, Orawing Review, 
019079 Inspection, 
Specifications 
Review 
Material Usage Agreements Status 
--.!!a ••• 
I .... 
Submittal Status 
MUAs (1) Date 
Sourc~ Submitted Submitted Open Rejected Approved 
Ithaco 9 4-17-92 9 0 0 
Loral 15 6-12-92 14 0 1 
Sage 0 
Gulton 4 6-23-92 4 0 -0 
Kearfott 17 4-30-92 (6) 17 0 0 
6-11-92 (8) 
6-23-92 (3) 
Pyronetics 1 5-15-92 1 0 0 
Statham 1 5-15-92 0 0 0 
TRW 1 4-14-92 0 0 1 
(1) MUAs submitted to GSFC as CORL PA-11. 
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• • • 
• • 
Overview Comparison ot-NHB 5300.4(3A-1),. 
MIL-STD-2000 and MIL-STD-2000A 
Requirement NHB 5300.4 MIL-STD-2000 
Lead/wire Deformation None Open 
Insulation Deformation None None 
Broken Strands Permissible No Yes (Up to 6) 
Nicks, Cuts, Scrapes No Yes 
Parts Mounting Parallel and in Approx. parallel 
contact <0.015 inches 
spacing 
Surface Mount 3-5.5 (W or D)/Foot 1W or 2D/Foot 
Overhang None permitted 25% side (flat) 
Toe (25% W or D) 
Heel Fillet No mention Required 
Stress Relief Soft requirement 1D to 0.030" 
Solder in Stress Relief Not permitted Allowed within limits 
W = width, D = Diameter 
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• 
MIL-STD-2000A 
100/0 maximum 
200/0 maximum 
No 
Yes «10%) 
Approx parallel 
<0.025 inches 
spacing 
1 W or 2D/Foot 
25% side (flat) 
Toe (within Ellimits) 
Required 
1D minimum 
Allowed within limits 
Overview Comparison of NHB 5300.4(3A-1), 
MIL-STD-2000 and MIL-STD-2000A (Continued) 
Requirement NHB 5300.4 MIL-STD-2000 MIL-STD-2000A 
Lead End Base Metal Not permitted Not permitted Permitted 
Exposure 
Chip Devices Not addressed Covered Covered 
Visual Appearance Perfect 5% cosmetic defects 10% cosmetic defects 
Turret Terminal 1800 to 2700 1800 to 2700 1800 - no overlap 
28 awg 1800 to 3600 for all except 
Hook Terminal 1800 to 2700 1800 to 2700 rectangular 
Pierced Terminal 900 to 2700 1800 to 2700 
2-Sided Boards Wire in all holes No requirement No requirement 
Plated through Holes Filled with solder 25% solder Rec. 25% solder Rec. 
Hand Soldered Boards' Vias Filled with solder No solder required No solder required 
Solder Contamination Gold and Copper All elements permits All elements permits 
only dumping dumping 
All other differences are minor 
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• • • 
• • • --~ ... 
11'8 
EEE Parts Program 
47, Performance Assurance 
• • • 
TOMS-EP EEE Parts Program --~ .. . I ... . 
• EEE Parts 
• Project Material Surveillance Plan 
• Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Qualification 
48, Performanca As8urance 
EEE Parts Overview 
• TOMS-EP EEE parts program imple,mentation 
- GSFC, TRW, and subcontractors team effort 
--~ ... I~-
-, In accordance with modified Section 5 of GSFC PAR, GSFC-450-006, 
(GPAR) 
Fly quality parts 
- Special attention to GIDEP alerts 
• NSPAR and parts procurement issues have been and are being worked 
during weekly GSFCrrRW telecons, on-going telephone conversations with 
GSFC parts branch personnel, and TRW-PMPCBs. 
• Implementation of modified Section 5 of GPAR reduced total NSPARs from 
252 to 157. Modified Section 5 also required nonstandard parts QCI data 
be submitted to GSFC 
• Subcontractors are being reviewed for compliance 
- EEE Parts Control Plan 
- Parts Identification List including NSPARs 
- DPA Procedures 
- TRW Parts Audits 
• TOMS-EP PAPL includes all subcontractors and TRW EEE Parts Lists. 
Updated PAPL released 17 July 1992 
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• • • 
• • • 
EEE Parts 
Summary of Requirements Versus .Compliance 
PAR Requirement 
Original PAR classified a Grade 2, or better, 
part per PPL-19 as standard. All other parts 
classified as nonstandard including hybrids. 
aCI data with NSPAR not specified. 
Modified PAR expanded the definition of a stand-
ard part to be selected in order of preference: 
1. Grade 2 or better per PPL-19 
2. All JAN microcircuits, JANTXffXV semicon-
ductors, and ER passive parts. 
3. Microcircuit procedures on a DESC certified 
aPL line with deliverable lot related aCI data. 
4. Same as 3 except acceptable generic aCI 
data 
All other parts classified as nonstandard requiring 
NSPAR and established reliability (ER) 
Compliance 
Identified 252 parts as nonstandard, requiring a NSPAR 
for GSFC approval. 
Identified 95 parts (390/0) that were reclassified as 
standard. 
Remaining 157 parts require a NSPAR for GSpC 
approval 
aCI data to be delivered to GSFC with the NSPAR. aCI data is being supplied with the NSPAR 
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EEE Parts 
Summary of Requirements Versus Compliance 
(Continued) 
PAR Requirement 
Derating per 5.2.3 using PPL-19 
Radiation hardness per 5.2.4 includes 
Screening verification per 5.2.5 for all 
JANTXlTXV semiconductors 
DPA per GSFC S-311-M-70 on a sample of 
each Lot Date Code for microcircuits, hybrids, 
semiconductors, nonstandard relays and 
crystal oscillators 
Parts Identification List (PIL) per 5.3 
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• 
Compliance 
Derating per PPL-19/MIL-STD-975 and/or 002700. 
Component internal dose rate 14 krads (Si) for 60 mil 
aluminum wall with 100 mil base plate for 2-year 
duration 
All JANTXlTXV semiconductors will be rescreened. 
Some Loral parts from stock will require a waiver. 
DPA is performed per TRW DPA procedure 
M273876R 
TRW PAPL 019078 includes all requirements 
specified. All subcontractor parts lists are being 
incorporated. PAPL will include a sort by 
subcontracto r 
• • 
• • • 
NSPAR Status --~ .. . I ... . 
NSPAR Status 7/27/92 
SUBCONTRACTOR/TRW STATUS· LORAL ITHACO KEARFOTT GULTON TRW TOTAL 
TOTAL NSPARS SUBMITTED BY SUB 58 49 80 37 28 252 
- WITHDRAWN 2 4 5 14 0 25 
- SUPPLIED BY GSFC OR TRW 0 1 0 0 0 1 
TOTAL NSPAR PRIOR TO MODIFIED PAR 56 44 75 23 28 226 
-
- STANDARD PARTS PER MODIFIED PAR 3 23 27 16 a 69 
TOTAL MODIFIED PAR NSPARS 53 21 48 7 28 157 
APPROVED BY TRW 36 13 16 6 13 84 
- -
APPROVAL PENDING RECEIPT OF QCI DATA 0 2 11 0 o· 13 
INPROCESS AT TRW 7 2 6 1 15 31 
RETURNED TO SUB FOR REVISION 10 4 15 0 0 29 
GSFC I TRW STATUS LORAL ITHACO KEARFOTT GULTON TRW TOTAL 
MODIFIED PAR NSPARS SUBMITTED TO GSFC • 52 15 49 7 20 143 
APPROVED BY GSFC· .21 0 10 0 7 38 
-
REJECTED BY GSFC 18 0 28 0 13 59 
WAIVERS SUBMITTED 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 
---
WAIVERS APPROVED 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-.-.. 
- --
INPROCESS AT GSFC 13 15 11 7 0 46 
" Excluding Standard Parts Per the Modifed PAR. 
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EEE Parts 
GSFC Rejected NSPARs Under Review 
Basis of Rejection 
Inadequate information 
(e.g., specification modification,' 
etc.) 
Inadequate or no eel data 
available 
Not space qualified part 
(e.g., failed PDA, nonhermetic 
package, etc.) 
Total 
53, Performance Assurance 
• 
Loral Ithaco Kearfott Gulton TRW 
5 0 19 0 7 
11 0 0 0 6 
2 0 9 0 0 
18 0 28 0 13 
• 
--~ ... I~-
Total 
31 
17 
11 
59 
• 
• • • 
EEE Parts 
--.!!a ••• 
I~-
TRW Clo~eout Plan for Rejected NSPARs 
• Evaluate basis for each rejection 
- Supply additional information requested, e.g. updated specification, 
missing document, etc. 
- Where applicable, confirm that missing aCI data will be supplied 
and the expected due date 
Where data is not available, assess alternatives 
(1) Determine that the quality of the part is acceptable without 
data; request waiver 
'(2) Conduct tests to acquire data 
(3) Change out part 
- Where data shows lot test data exceeds specified rates 
(1) Assess degree to which specified rates are exceeded. If 
acceptable, request waiver. 
(2) Change out part 
• Request waivers 
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Project Material Surveillance Plan ... ~ ... I~-
Objective 
To ensure all piece parts required by each vendor and by TRW support 
manufacturing schedules in a timely manner with approved parts using 
TRW and GSFC parts resources 
Plan 
• Review each vendors bill of material and procurement plan 
• Follow-up with weekly telecons to review material delivery status 
• Publish schedule critical parts reports monthly 
• Furnish TRW inventory material when available and applicable 
• Review procurement status of schedule critical EEE parts with GSFC 
during weekly telecons 
• Solicit GSFC assistance in procuring schedule critical EEE parts as 
needed 
• Visit or interface with subtier vendors to assist/expedite delivery 
• Coordinate consolidated procurements for units being built at TRW 
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Parts Being Supplied by- GSFC 
VDE Unit (TRW) 
Expected 
Part Number Quantity 'Delivery (1) Part Number 
54HCSOO 15 9-15-92 54HCS02 
54HCS32 8 9-15-92 54HCS04 
54HCS74 15 9-15-92 54HCS08 
54HCS244 12 9-15-92 54HCS138 
HS181C55RH8 9 9-15-92 54HCS14 
HS180C85RH 5 9-15-92 54HCS161 
HM6617883 5 9-15-92 54HCS374 
Gulton 
Expected 
Part Number Quantity Delivery 
HS1-80C86RH-Q 12 8-15-92 
HS1-1840RH-8 54 8-15-92 
HS1-82C545RH-Q 12 8-15-92 
HS1-82C37 ARH-Q 12 8-15-92 
Ithaco 
Expected 
Part Number Quantity Delivery 
1R7130 24 7-20-92 
IRC 
Notes: All parts completely tested/screened and DPA by GSFC 
(1) Date change from 8-15-92 to 9-15-92 
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• 
Expected 
Quantity Delivery 
5 9-15-92 
7 9-15-92 
7 9-15-92 
7 9-15-92 
5 9-15-92 
15 9-15-92 
5 9-15-92 
• • • 
Field Programmable Gate Array Program 
57, Performance Assurance 
• • 
Implementation and Basis of Implementation 
TOMS-EP Field Programmable Gate Array 
. (FPGA) Program 
• TOMS-EP subcontractors use Actel FPGAs to: 
- Reduce design and qualification costs 
- Reduce board space and weight 
• TRW Evaluation of Actel FPGA 
- Complete evaluation conducted for TRW Universal Test Bed (UTB) 
Project 
• 3,700 hour accelerated life test 
• DPAs including cross section and current density calculations 
• Radiation testing 
- Collected data from JPL, Hughes, John Hopkins, and Aerospace. 
Corp. on all versions of FPGAs from Actel 
Part of a industry team (JPL, Hughes, Aerospace, and TRW) to 
evaluate Actel 1280 FPGA 
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• 
NASAlGSFC Evaluation of FPGA for 
TOMS-EP 
• GSFC parts branch personnel visited TRW for 
- Technical discussion of Actel's FPGA and "Antifuse" technology 
- Evaluation of TRW's FPGA design, programming, evaluation 
equipment and test data 
Review of TRW's life test capabilities 
• GSFC parts branch and TRW visited Actel for 
- Technical discussions of wafer processing, assembly and test 
- Discussions regarding programming reliability and Class Band S 
testing of unprogrammed FPGAs . 
• GSFC and TRW have agreed that 
Actel's "antifuse" technology is a permanent, nonreversible 
mechanism for creating logic patterns in the FPGA 
- Post programming burn-in is not required. Dynamic burn-in of 
unprogrammed FPGAs stresses all logic cells and is more through 
than post programming burn-in 
- Samples programmed at the same time as the flight units with Alpha 
91 test circuit will qualify the FPGA lot and the programming station 
- The technology is relatively new and requires continuous monitoring 
until substantial data is collected 
• GSFC has approved TRW/Gulton FPGA NSPARs 
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TOMS-EP Approach for .. 
Purchase and Qualification of FPGAs 
• Purchase one lot for use by all subcontractors 
- Lower qualification costs 
_. Lower purchase price 
• TRW to perform Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) 
• TRW to perform Life Test (1000 hours dynamic burn-in at 125°C) 
- Stage 1: TRW program 22 units followed by burn-in 
• 
--~ ... I~-
- Stage 2: Subcontractors program 22 units before and after flight 
units followed by burn-in by TRW 
• TRW to audit subcontractor's FPGA capabilities and controls 
(complete) 
• Calibrate programming system for flight units programming 
• TRW to compile, analyze, and publish lot qualification report 
• TRW/Gulton to submit NSPARs for FPGA 
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FPGA Qualification Schedule for TOMS-EP Project 
May '92 JI61 '92 I JIJ '92 I Aug '92 Sept '92 I Oct '92 Nov '92 Dec '92 Ta.k D •• crlptlon Start Date Finish Date 
7 21 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 ·24 31 7 14 21 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30 14 
lila Test (TRW) 
Program Life Test Units 5115/92 5116/92 fj7 
Perform Life Test 5/30/92 7114/92 
" 
FPGS DPA (Lot Qualification) 5/27192 6/10/92 
Ithaoo 
Survey FPGA Station and Procedures 5/18/92 5/19/92 .~~ 
Convert Pinout - PGA to flat pack 5/25/92 5/26/92 /y 
Program FPGAs for ETB (first hall) 6/14/92 6/15/92 1. ~ 
Incorporate New Designs (3 each) 7/7192 718192 ~ 
Program Balance of ETB FPGAs 7m92 7/7/92 ~ 
Ship PWBs with FPGAs to Ithaoo (ETB) 7/23/92 7/27/92 its ~ 
Program TOMS FPGAs 8/17192 8/18/92 /~ 
Test ·Ithaoo· Life Test Units 8/18/92 8/19/92 ~ 
Ship PWBs with FPGAs to Ithaoo 8/20/92 8/21/92 [lSi 
Coordinate and Resolve FPGA Issues 5119192 9/4/92 --,-y--.,,-,,«, .,."., ... 'c. -'~ 
Kearfott 
Survey FPGA Station and Procedures 5/20/92 5/21/92 i(SI 
Program FPGA (Kearfott) 6/29/92 712192 
.)51 
Test Kearfott Life Test Units 718192 7110/92 ~ 
Monitor FPGA Programming and Testing 5/21/92 7/10/92 ,~~ , 
Gulton 
Survey FPGA Station and Procedures 6/23/92 6/24/92 ~ 
Program FPGA (27 designs) 10/5/92 11/2/92 
Test Gulton Life Test Units 10/5/92 11/4/92 
Monitor FPGA Programming and Testing 6/8192 1119/92 
Ufe Test (subcontractor) 
Perform Accelerated Life Test 11/6/92 12121192 
Correlate.&. Analyze TRW & Subcontractor 7/23/92 12123/92 .7 
life Test Results 
Publish FPGA Qualification Report 12114/92 12123/92 ~~ 
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Quality Assurance 
62, Performance Assurance 
• • • 
Quality Assurance Implementation 
• Hardware quality assurance (QA) requirements and implementation plans 
contained in PAl P 
• TRW QA program being implemented in accordance with TRW company 
manuals, and TOMS-EP project plans 
Manuals TOMS-EP Plans 
- Hardware Quality Assurance Manual - ESD Control Plan 
- Software Quality Assurance Manual - Contamination Control Plan 
- Quality Directives - Configuration Management Plan 
- Measurement Assurance Manual - Manufacturing (Fabrication and Inspection) Plan 
- Configuration Management Manual - Software Management Plan 
• TRW's QA system complies with NHB 5300.4(1 B) 
• Project specific requirements are flowed down via quality project requirements 
(QPR) documents to performing organizations within TRW, e.g. procurement 
document review, receiving inspection requirements,mandatory government 
inspection points, etc. 
• Subcontractor QA requirements are contained in TRW subcontractor PARs 
and TRW quality (Q) clauses 
- NHB 5300.4(1 B) QA program required of subcontractors supplying 
components containing EEE parts, PAR 700-394 
- NHB 5300.4(1 C) QA program required of subcontractors supplying 
mechanical devices and assemblies, PAR 700-398 
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Quality Assurance Implementation (Continued) 
- Quality assurance provisions are specified in subsystem and 
equipment (EQ) specifications 
- Established interface with resident NASA representative 
- TRW source QA for must subcontractors is being implemented through 
audits versus TRW resident QA. If audits indicate the need, TRW 
source inspection is implemented as required. 
-Dedicated TRW source QA surveillance is being implemented at Luna 
Defense Systems Inc. 
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Quality Assurance Requirements 
Versus Compliance/Implementation 
Requirement Compliance 
GPAR GSFC-4S0-006: 
8.1 General HQAM 0.0 
8.2 Organization HQAM 1.1 
8.3 Configuration Control and Verification CMM 1.0,4.4 
8.4 Identification and Traceability CMM 1.0 
8.5 Procurement Requirements HQAM 3.0 
. 8.5.1 Contractor Source Inspection HQAM 3.0 
8.5.2 Procurement Review by the HQAM 3.0 
Government 
8.6 Contractor Receiving Inspection QO.P783,0012 
AD2-016 
8.8 Contamination Control HQAM 5.5 
8.9 Electrostatic Discharge Control HQAM 5.4 
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• 
Implementation 
PAIP 1.0 
PAIP 1.1.3 
Configuration Management Plan, 
019084 
Configuration Management Plan, 
019084 
PAR 700-394, PAR 700-398 
PAIP 8.5.1 
PAIP 8.5.2, PAR 700-394 
(para 8.5.2), PAR 700-398, 
(para 8.5.2) 
Receiving Inspection QPR, 
QPR 11540 
Contamination Control Plan, 
019082 
Electrostatic Discharge Control 
Plan, 019094 
Quality Assurance Requirements 
Versus Compliance/Implementation (Continued) 
Requirement Compliance Implementation 
GPAR GSFC-4S0-006: 
8.10 Nonconformance Control· HQAM 9.5 QD.P783.0002 
8.10.1 Control, Disposition and HQAM 9.5 QD.P783.0001 
Reporting of Discrepancies 
8.1 0~2 Failure Reporting HQAM 4.8 PAIP, 8.10.2 
8.12 Inspection and Tests HQAM 4.0 QD.P783.0001 
8.12.2 Inspection and Test Reports HQAM 7.1 PAIP 8.12.5 
8.12.4 Inspection and Test of Stored Property Manual PAIP8.17 
Stock Hardware 6.01 
8.12.5 QA Activities during the Integration HQAM 4.0 PAIP 8.12.4 
and Test Phase 
8.12.6 Records of Inspection and Test HQAM 7.1 PAIP 8.12.5 
8.15 Stamp Control HQAM 8.1 PAIP 8.15 
8.16 Handling, Stage, Preservation HQAM 12.1 Transportation and Handling 
Marking, Labeling, Packaging, Plan, D19088 
Packing and Shipping 
8.17· Government Property Control Property Manual Control of Government Furnished 
Property Plan, D19090 
8.18. Government Acceptance HQAM 4.9 PAIP 8.18 
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Quality Assurance Status 
• Several QPRs have been generated to flowdown quality requirements 
within TRW . 
• MRS authorization issued to six subcontractors 
• Subcontractor manufacturing flow plans reviewed. Mandatory inspection 
points established 
• TRW MRS list generated 
• Surveys of subcontractors conducted to verify compliance to NHS 
standards. Subcontractors placed in TRW Quality Assurance Suppliers 
Directory (QASD) upon satisfactory close out of survey 
• A number of subcontractor audits have been conducted and closed to 
date 
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Subcontractor Audit Schedule for 
TOMS-EP Project 
1992 
Subcontractor April MIrf I June July i August I September October 
--~ ... I~-
1993 
November December January I February March 
20 Z1 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29 8 13 20 27! 3 10 17 24 31! 7 14 21 28 5 12 19 28 2 9 18 23 30 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 1 8 15 22 
Audits Scheduled: 
Gulton 
Loral Conic 
Sage 
Ithaco. 
Kearfott 
Hughes 
PSI 
Wright 
Vacco 
Tayco 
Ideas 
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TRW Subcontractor Audit Approach --~ ... I~-
• Three basic audits are planned at most subcontractor's facilities 
- PA requirements flow down (kickoff prefabrication) 
_. In process fabrication 
- In process test prior to closeout 
• All audits performed to prepared checklists designed to assure 
subcontractor compliance to PAR document requirements 
- Checklist multidisciplined. Includes QA disciplines, PM&P control, 
software control, etc. 
- . Checklists forwarded to subcontractor at least a week in advance of 
audit 
• Audit team consists of speCialists, including quality engineer, parts 
engineer, M&P engineer, FPGA parts engineer, responsible design 
engineer, etc. 
• Audits are successful in identifying systemic issues 
• Currently 30 audits are scheduled at 11 subcontractors, 7 audits 
completed to date of which 5 closed 
• Similarly, software audits are being implemented at Colorado Springs. 
Two audits completed to date. 
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Quality Assurance Involvement in Subcontractor 
Activities (RFP to Delivery) 
• Award Process , 
- Quality assurance requirements generated for subcontractor PAR 
documents 
_. TRW "Q" clauses identified for each subcontract 
- Statements of work reviewed 
- Proposals evaluated during source selection process 
- QA surveys conducted as required to NHB 5300.4(1 B) or (1C) 
- Purchase orders reviewed and stamped by quality engineer 
• Manufacturing Process 
- Subcontractor deliverables reviewed and approved 
- Subcontractor fabrication and inspection flow reviewed and approved for 
TRW and GSFC mandatory inspection points .. 
- Issue Type II material review board authorization upon GS FC approval 
- Process Supplier Information Requests (STR) for discrepancies 
- Lead the conduct of TRW audits at subcontractor facilities and source 
inspection 
• Test and Delivery 
- Lead the conduct of TRW audits at subcontractor facilities and source 
inspection 
- Participate in failure reporting 
- Perform final source inspection 
- Review end item data package for acceptance 
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TRW Quality Engineering 
at Luna Defense Systems Inc. 
• Dedicated TRW source QA surveillance is being implemented at 
Luna Defense Systems Inc. 
- TRW and LDSI team effort 
• Structural Test Model (STM) is the pathfinder for TOMS-EP 
- Developing and validating manufacturing and assembly 
process with STM 
Full configuration control being implemented 
- Full TRW inspection of piece parts and assembly being 
implemented 
- Full documentation, e.g. STM material configurations, process 
certifications, and traceability 
• STM will be to flight quality standards 
• TOMS-EP flight structure will have 
- Configuration control to TRW standards 
- Total TRW source inspection of piece parts and assembly 
- Full documentation, e.g. material certifications, process 
certifications and traceability 
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• 
Software Quality Assurance 
and 
Configuration Management 
• 
• • 
Configuration Management 
• Internal design requirements baseline established following POR: 
ICOs, system specification, MOI/EOI specifications, and system 
description document placed under formal CCB control 
• 18 CCBs conducted during this phase 
• Configuration management requirements flowed to subcontractors via 
PAR documents; all subcontractor CM plans reviewed and approved 
• Allocated baseline will be established following COR; changes to all 
specifications and ICOs will be processed through the CCB 
• Specification Tree (CORL SE-05) updated 
• Configured Articles Lists (CORL PA-22) updated 
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Software Quality Assurance and Configuration 
Management Requirements Versus Compliance 
Requirements 
GPAR 
10.3.1 Software Standards forQA 
10.3.2 Assurance Function for 
for Verifying Standards 
Compliance 
PAIP 10.3, TRW Software 
QA Manual (SQAM) 
SQAM 3.0 
SQAM 5.0 
Implementation 
Conduct reviews and audits 
Perform test surveillance 
10.4 Establish a Software TRW Configuration Man- Apply CM levels of control; 
Configuration Management Process agement Manual (CMM) perform computer program 
100.2, 102.2, 102.5, 102.6, identification and control 
103.2, and 103.5 
10.5 Software Nonconformance 
Reporting and Corrective Action 
Process 
SQAM 5.0 Perform software problem 
reporting, analysis, and 
support corrective action 
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Software Assurance Implementation 
• Review and approve the following documents 
- Software Management Plan 
- Software Require"ments Specification 
- Software Standards and Procedures Document 
- Flight Software Verification Test Plans, Procedures, and Reports 
• Review and audit software development folders 
• Attend and participate in Software PDA, PDR, CDA, CDR, "PMRS, and 
design walkthroughs 
• Audit software being developed by Colorado Springs Engineering 
Operations (CSEO) 
• Develop a software problem reporting system 
• Monitor flight software functional tests 
• Witness flight software verification tests 
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• 
Software Assurance Implementation 
(Continued) 
• Review and approve software problem reports 
• . Participate in the software CCB process and test review boards 
• Implement software quality metrics 
- Requirements stability, initiated at SRS baseline 
- Software problem reports, initiated at software integration test 
--~ ... 
I~-
- Lines of code change, initiated at flight software verification test 
76, Performance Assurance 
• • • 
• 
Software Assurance Status/Accomplishments 
• Continuous interaction with TRW software developers and GSFC software 
assurance representative 
• Reviewed and approved project software documents 
- Software Management Plan . 
- . Interim versions of the Software Requirements Specification 
- Flight Software Standards and Procedures document 
- Flight Software Verification Test Plans 
• Conducted two software assurance audits at CSEO to date 
- Software assurance requirements flowdown 
- Reviewed/audited software development folders 
• DPRO (DCMAO) in Colorado Springs is also auditing software 
development folders 
• Participated in PDA, PDR, PMRS, CDA, CDR, and design walkthroughs 
• Developed a software problem reporting system 
• Monitoring flight software functional testing 
• Performing a traceability analysis of requirements to flight software test 
cases 
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A&T 
AC 
ACDS 
ACQ 
AID 
ADE 
AHr 
AOS 
ARAR 
ARE 
ARM 
ASA 
ASTM 
ATC 
ATS 
BCCA 
BSF 
BSR 
C/O 
CAL" 
CAP 
CCB 
CDA 
CEA 
CFR 
CG 
CIB 
. CM 
CMM 
CMS 
CONV 
CPT 
CPU 
CSA 
CSEO 
CSSA 
CTV 
CVCM 
OIL 
DDLS 
DIU 
DMA 
DP 
DPA 
DPRO 
DSN 
DTM 
EED 
EEOC 
EEE 
1,CDR Acronyms 
CDR Acronym List 
Assembly and Test 
Air Conditioning. (Launch VEhicle) 
. Attitude Control & Determination Subsystem 
Acquisition . -. 
Analog-to-Digital 
Attitude Determination Electonics 
Ampere Hour 
Acquisition of Signal 
Accident Risk Assessment Report 
Array Req. Electronics 
Array Regulator Modules 
Aluminum Substrate Assembly 
American Society for Testing and Materials 
Absolute Timed Commands 
Absolute Time Sequence 
Battery Charge Control Algorithm 
Back Surface Field 
Back Surface Reflector 
Check Out 
Calibration 
Contamination Analysis Program 
Configuration Change Board 
Critical Design Audit 
Control Electronics Assembly 
Captive Flight Release 
Center of Gravity 
Command Input Buffer 
Center of Mass 
Configuration Management Manual 
Command Management System 
Converter 
Comprehensive Performance Test 
Central Processing Unit 
Command Storage Area 
Colorado Springs Engineering Operations 
Coarse Sun Sensor Assembly 
Compatibility Test Van 
Collected Volatile Condensible Material 
Downlink 
Deployment Device Load Simulator 
Diode Isolation Unit 
Direct Memory ACcess 
Data Processor 
Destructive Physical Analysis 
Defense Plant Representative Office 
Deep Space Network 
Dual Thruster Module 
Electro:.Explosive Device 
Electro-Explosive Device Controller 
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical 
EGSE 
EM 
EMC 
EMI 
EMISM 
EQ 
ER 
ESD 
ETB 
EV 
FDM 
FMEA 
FOV 
FPGA 
FSA 
FSSA 
GFE 
GFP' 
GN2 
GAA 
GSE 
GSTDN 
HIL 
HIW 
HEX 
HQAM 
lie 
IIF 
ICD 
ICMT 
IFJ 
IGSE 
liS 
IA 
IVf . 
KBPS 
KPD 
LDSI 
LOS 
LPO 
LV 
LVAB 
LVI 
M&P 
MDE 
MGSE 
MLI 
MMS 
MAB 
MTA 
2,CDR Acronyms 
Electrical Ground S~Qf:t Equ.iprnent . 
Engineering Model 
Electromagnetic Compatib~ity iT" , , 
Electromagnetic Int~6~~, F,ni)d · .. <!~~;i 
Electromagnetic Interferenc~&~ytMatgms/ 
Equipment muibB'J L~,"l";:V~ 
Established Reliability f1C')" ... lSC;·' 
Electros~i~·PiSQfwrg~J .. , 2+",.5':; b' ~.Sl: 
Eagle Test Bed . 9~jb12S8 .,; ,':,0" If ,~. 
Environmental !" :.3t2',:2ou2 1(:':l ,c;/-. • ,;~; 
Flexible Data Mux i.1o:no8 290nsio8 i81 ,.i" 
Failure Mode Effect anrrid Criticali~YrARalysis ' 
Field of View .) 
Field Programmable ~atEtAq9Y::' ,... _ 
Fail-SAfe Algorithm ,'" 1'~,,: ,'\ C 
,5':i::ffmh§~r.k~~flSQnl\~se~bly '. -,'-. 
t~.s>V;f~X:fl:~~Fuf,ni~h~~::l;q~if)ment . \ ... ' 
Government Fur~i.;s,~~ p.roperty ,: 
GaseOU~'1~ltr9Q.Sf;l::,R 8:Jf"i.L!,.2.0,\ ", ~.,f",-(." 
Gyro Reference ~~s~BbHs1:.;r;l'~:. " . 
Ground Sl;IPPq,f.tEqYtpm~~};j:;:' . 
Ground-Space Tracking and Oat~ Network 
Hard Line J!l~ .,t .. I: ;;.'>' '.: 'c- .T· i,' 
Hardware ',::~JTi:>rT:';::"'J BtaG ··,·')~c 
Base 16 (Hexadecimal) ::"yil 18\~'C, 
Hardware Quality AssufRnqfP:.J~~lm;: .. 
!In!e~~1~trcaJ:, JC)C'!Ci :'<'0 81F, .. ,. _ " 
interface )81rlf'"~ !OTt;l:':;'~'" r;~.::'i}<~;lcu~'~;'~" ~ , -"~'" ~~,:.;; 
Interface Control Document,;, ;:.1' '.', ,:.,'_J 
Intercontract Material Tra.n~fer ' , "' 
In-Flight Jumper 
Instrument Ground Suppo!1j-iql.!i~ent 
Instrument Interface Simul$Jnr:-:~: 
Instrument REW~9q2:i< "8' . .8rrl:~ 
Interrupt Vector Table '2;' , ' 
Kilo Bits Per Second 
Key Parameter D~aJaasE~uPEi'::; . 
Luna Defense Systems Inc. L"":'." ,'" , 
Line of Sight V" C:0-::M:;~·,"~.2 . 
Launch Project Office 
Launch Vehicle pn~ ': " 
Launch Vehicle As~m~l~ -BviJ}~i~:9 . , " 
Launch Vehicle Interface ,::n",'-,c;i c ! ~;L"- 'j 
Materials and Processes I'c .:;':'·;):L'" 
Motor Drive Electronics 
Mechanical Ground Support Equipment 
Multilayer Insulation or Machine ~anguage Instruction 
Mass Memo.rySup~rvisor ' :.~ 
Material Review Board·· " 
Magnetic:T~rquer. A~sem,ply . ." ;""j-
. :.,; '-.' '-'" 
• 
jc 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
MUA 
Mux 
NASCOM 
NDI 
NHB 
NiCd 
NO-OP 
NSPAR 
NVR 
OAS 
OSC 
P-E 
P/B 
PA 
PAF 
PAIP 
PAMPL 
PAPL 
PAR 
PCA 
PCMTS 
PCU 
PDA 
PDF 
PF 
PIL 
PMPCB 
POCC 
PPL 
PPT 
PRI 
PWB 
QA 
QCI 
QD 
QPL 
QPR 
AfT 
RAM 
RDNT 
RF 
RFTS 
RIU 
RPM 
RSS 
AT 
RTC 
RTCS 
RWA 
S&MS 
3,CDR Acronyms 
{b9!.tnf~DR) Mt-bIf9tft1'lTSf· (Huntinued) 
Materialtrsage~Agr~~ brh.JO',f) !S:Jilt,si3 
Multiplexer lebaM gr.iiGS'):qr:3 
NASA Communic~tf6n"":T1C;:1 :.'lLngsr01t:;:,-313 
Nondestructive I~Bfijrd 0!H4f'1QSlr.0110eI3 
NASA.sHa~~on919he1r~: :~-., '::mgsf"IlO1roei3 
Nickel Cadium tm;mq. Jr'3 
No Operation vtllidsilen bsr,zilcisj'e3 
Nonstandard Parts A~rGViillfe(i!i\9S,amto9!3 
Non-Volatile Residue .' :J9'8 !2sT;1gB3 
Orbital Adjust Subsystem ""3i11f'!Q'liv'? 
Orbital 'Science.~ Corporation ;.;tsr: " 'di:-. _ 
P&rkin mlrn.i!rS!);t!10 nmns .. ~, sbJM f'lUltb-i 
Play BAckW8iV rfJ blB.:l 
Performance As~arie&' eldBmrrmQ019 bler~ 
Payload Attach Fitting mrlthog!A etA2-1i~~ 
Performance Assura,n~e'a~~lrtflj)~@Hf&tibl\-Plan 
Project Approve(fM~terfEl15;a~'t%t 
Program Approve(!rpariS3u..~fr,:u=i tf!smmevof) 
Performance Assurance R~~nfuoeas8 
Physical Configurattd'fFM<ftf· 9Jn81t;~eR c~'l8 
Power and Controlmt51iitbf)!tEfSf~2 bnu0l8 
Power COntf{)pOriif'G gni;o" r":~' s8sqc-bnu01f) 
Preliminary Design Audit snU b1SH 
Programmable Data Formatter s"8wblSh 
Powe'red Flight (ism!:Jsb.sxei'!) a r eBBS 
Parts Idei-4tiffuatldfPlJr5t·!2eA '~tii.suO slswblSH 
Parts, Materials, and Process§St~tftilqJr5tirc!i 
Payload Operation Control Center e~snstn~ 
Preferred Parts Lisf ~,-, ~ '-.1 iC1tno8 9:Jst1eini 
Peak Power Tracking .hE'2sM tlsl!;"lOOlSfnl 
Primary 1sqmuL trlQiFi-n! 
Printed Wi(e:~I3tj'ardlCQq;,,)2 onuo"'f) tnsmuiJ:3l1i 
Quality Assuran"t§(!Slu rni8 90B7.,(.:Itnl tnDiTlUl12f1i 
Quality Conformance Insp.~~YFR tnernUL-;nI 
Quality. Directive elcET '(;beV rqu'nstnl 
Qualified Parts List bnoo98 leg afi8 ali>! 
Quality Project Req~O lstemslSQ '(9)1 
ReceivefTransmit .~ni ern2ky8 9211steQ snuJ 
Random Access Memory trlgi8 to eniJ 
Redundant 9:JinO tosimq r:onu£) 
Radio Frequency ei:JirlsV rlOnLJE_: 
Radio Freque'R6yq-e§tjs~8A sloirlsV n:JnLJf:J 
Remote Interface Unit',:,;:'-,3Tnl ebirieV :-bnu.sJ 
Revolutions Per Minute;': :::;;jO,q bnE B!si1etstv1 
Root Sum Squared '~~ 3Vi1C ';otoM 
Real Time .. ~, ,. - ')rv~ 
. Relative Time Command .• 
Relative Timed Command' 8.equence 
Reaction Wheel AsserrlblY:k '.; ... ':' 
Structure and Mechahism§ SUbsYStem 
32-B3 
N3 
ON3 
IN3 
M21N3 
{)3 
A~ 
a 23 
BT3 
V3 
~a1 
A3 M, 
V'o-=J 
ADq-; 
P-.2::'! 
AC-- 2=i 
. ct-=f8 
s V!8 
A.f-18 
:3 28 
\!lOT 8D 
-.J\H 
~f\H 
>C3H 
MAOH 
0\1 
4\1 
081 
TN10: 
L,I 
328) 
211 
RI 
TV; 
8C18>! 
ClCl)l 
!80J 
~OJ 
DqJ 
VJ 
8AVJ 
IVJ 
q J8M 
3 (]M 
32i8M 
IJM 
8t-v1M 
8 RM 
A..TM 
S/A 
SAR 
SIC 
SC AODR 
SELV 
SEMCAP 
SEU 
SIS 
SOH 
s'p 
SQAM 
SFtS 
STC 
STM 
S/W 
SWA 
SYNC 
r-o 
T/O 
TN 
TAM 
feD 
taR 
rCA 
feTS 
fCVL 
TOE 
TFS 
Tim 
TML 
,RASYS 
UIL 
liSART 
UTB 
UTC 
UV/OV 
VAS 
VAX 
VCM 
voC, 
VDE 
VOEA 
Vp-p 
WOT 
XMTR 
Xponder 
4,COR Acronyms 
CDR Acronym List (Continued) 
Solar Array 
Solar Array Regulator 
Spacecraft 
Spacecraft Address ' 
Small Expendable Launch Vehicle 
Specification Electro-Magnetic Compatibility Analysis Program 
Single Event Upset 
Spacecraft Interface Simulator 
State-of-Health 
Spacecraft Processor 
Software Quality Assurance Manual 
Software Requirements Specification 
System Test Controller 
Structural Test Model 
Software 
Scan Wheel Assembly 
Synchronous 
Time Zero 
Telemetry/Command 
Thermal Vacuum 
three-Axis Magnetometer 
To be determined 
To be' Reviewed 
Thrust Chamber Assembly 
Telemetry and Command Test Set 
Temperature Compensated Voltage Limit 
Torquer Drive Electronics 
TOMS Flight Software 
Telemetry 
Total Mass los 
Computer Program 
Up Link 
Universal Synchronous Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter 
Universal Test Bed 
Universal Time, Coordinated 
Under Voltage/Over Voltage 
Vehicle Assembly Building 
Mini-computer 
Volatile Condensible Material 
Volt Direct Current 
Valve Drive Electronics 
Valve Drive Electronics As~embly 
Volts Peak to Peak 
Watch Dog Timer 
Transmitter 
Transponder 
• 
• 
• 
